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PREFACE
 In 1998 Congress passed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act [P.L. 105-246] 
as part of a series of efforts to identify, declassify, and release federal records on 
the perpetration of Nazi war crimes and on Allied efforts to locate and punish 
war criminals.   Under the direction of the National Archives the Interagency 
Working Group [IWG] opened to research over 8 million of pages of records - 
including recent 21st century documentation.  Of particular importance to this 
volume are many declassified intelligence records from the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Army Intelligence Command, which were not fully processed 
and available at the time that the IWG issued its Final Report in 2007.
 As a consequence, Congress [in HR 110-920] charged the National Archives 
in 2009  to  prepare an additional historical volume as a companion piece to 
its 2005 volume U. S. Intelligence and the Nazis.  Professors Richard Breitman 
and Norman J. W. Goda note in Hitler’s Shadow that these CIA & Army records 
produced new “evidence of war crimes and about wartime activities of war 
criminals; postwar documents on the search for war criminals; documents about 
the escape of war criminals; documents about the Allied protection or use of war 
criminals; and documents about the postwar activities of war criminals”. 
 This volume of essays points to the significant impact that flowed from 
Congress and the Executive Branch agencies in adopting a broader and fuller 
release of previously security classified war crimes documentation. Details about 
records processed by the IWG and released by the National Archives are more 
fully described on our website iwg@nara.gov.
William Cunliffe, Office of Records Services, 
National Archives and Records Administration
1INTRODUCTION
At the end of World War II, Allied armies recovered a large portion of the 
written or filmed evidence of the Holocaust and other forms of Nazi persecution. 
Allied prosecutors used newly found records in numerous war crimes trials. 
Governments released many related documents regarding war criminals during 
the second half of the 20th century. A small segment of American-held documents 
from Nazi Germany or about Nazi officials and Nazi collaborators, however, 
remained classified into the 21st century because of government restrictions on 
the release of intelligence-related records. 
Approximately 8 million pages of documents declassified in the United 
States under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act added significantly to 
our knowledge of wartime Nazi crimes and the postwar fate of suspected war 
criminals. A 2004 U.S. Government report by a team of independent historians 
working with the government’s Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working 
Group (IWG), entitled U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, highlighted some of the 
new information; it appeared with revisions as a 2005 book.1 Our 2010 report 
serves as an addendum to U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis; it draws upon additional 
documents declassified since then. 
The latest CIA and Army files have: evidence of war crimes and about the 
wartime activities of war criminals; postwar documents on the search for or 
prosecution of war criminals; documents about the escape of war criminals; 
documents about the Allied protection or use of Nazi war criminals; and 
documents about the postwar political activities of war criminals. None of the 
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declassified documents conveys a complete story in itself; to make sense of this 
evidence, we have also drawn on older documents and published works. 
The Timing of Declassification
Why did the most recent declassifications take so long? In 2005–07 the 
Central Intelligence Agency adopted a more liberal interpretation of the 1998 
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. As a result, CIA declassified and turned over 
to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) additional 
documents from pre-existing files as well as entirely new CIA files, totaling more 
than 1,100 files in all. Taken together, there were several thousand pages of new 
CIA records that no one outside the CIA had seen previously.
A much larger collection came from the Army. In the early postwar years, 
the Army had the largest U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations 
in Europe; it also led the search for Nazi war criminals. In 1946 Army intelligence 
(G-2) and the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) had little competition—
the CIA was not established until a year later. Even afterwards, the Army remained 
a critical factor in intelligence work in central Europe. 
Years ago the Army facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, turned over to NARA 
its classified Intelligence and Security Command Records for Europe from the 
period (approximately) 1945–63. Mostly counterintelligence records from the 
Army’s Investigative Records Repository (IRR), this collection promised to be 
a rich source of information about whether the United States maintained an 
interest in war crimes and Nazi war criminals. 
After preserving these records on microfilm, and then on a now obsolete 
system of optical disks, the Army destroyed many of the paper documents. But 
the microfilm deteriorated, and NARA could not read or recover about half of 
the files on the optical disks, let alone declassify and make them available. NARA 
needed additional resources and technology to solve the technological problems 
and transfer the IRR files to a special computer server. Declassification of these 
IRR files only began in 2009, after the IWG had gone out of existence. 
This new Army IRR collection comprises 1.3 million files and many millions 
of pages. It will be years before all of these Army files are available for researchers. 
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For this report we have drawn selectively upon hundreds of these IRR files, 
amounting to many thousands of pages, which have been declassified and are 
already available at NARA.
Intelligence Organizations and War Crimes
American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations each had its own 
raison d’être, its own institutional interests, and its own priorities. Unfortunately, 
intelligence officials generally did not record their general policies and attitudes 
toward war crimes and war criminals, so that we hunted for evidence in their 
handling of individual cases. Despite variations, these specific cases do show 
a pattern: the issue of capturing and punishing war criminals became less 
important over time. During the last months of the war and shortly after it, 
capturing enemies, collecting evidence about them, and punishing them 
seemed quite consistent. Undoubtedly, the onset of the Cold War gave American 
intelligence organizations new functions, new priorities, and new foes. Settling 
scores with Germans or German collaborators seemed less pressing; in some 
cases, it even appeared counterproductive. 
In the months after the war in Europe ended Allied forces struggled to 
comprehend the welter of Nazi organizations. Allied intelligence agencies initially 
scrutinized their German intelligence counterparts for signs of participation 
in underground organizations, resistance, or sabotage. Assessing threats to the 
Allied occupation of Germany, they thought first of Nazi fanatics and German 
intelligence officials. Nazi officials in the concentration camps had obviously 
committed terrible crimes, but the evidence about the Gestapo was not as striking. 
The Allies started by trying to find out who had been responsible for what.
NOTES
 1 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the 
Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Gertrude (Traudl) Junge, one of Hitler’s personal secretaries, stayed in the Reichschancellery bunker to 
take Hitler’s last will and testament before his suicide.  Junge describes the perils in working her way 
through the Russian lines surrounding Berlin.  She relates meeting Hitler’s chauffeur Kemka and of the 
deaths of Martin Bormann, Stumpfegger, and Naumann, when their armored car was blown up.
RG 319, Records of the Army Staff.
CHAPTER ONE
New Information on Major Nazi Figures
Newly released Army records yield bits of intriguing information collected by 
the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) after the war about some leading 
officials of the Nazi regime. The new information tends to confirm rather than 
change what historians have known about leading Nazi functionaries and their 
postwar fates. At the same time, it provides sharper focus than before.
New Interrogations of Hitler’s Personal Secretary
Gertraud (Traudl) Junge, Adolf Hitler’s secretary starting in January 1943, took 
the dictation for Hitler’s final testaments on April 29, 1945, the night before 
Hitler committed suicide. On May 2, 1945, she fled Hitler’s bunker in Berlin with 
a small group, trying to move through Soviet lines to safety. The Soviets captured 
her on June 3. They imprisoned and interrogated her in their sector of Berlin. 
She left Berlin and went to Munich in April 1946.
Junge’s recollections are an important source for Hitler’s final days in the 
bunker. Soviet intelligence took great pains to confirm Hitler’s death amidst 
persistent rumors that he was still alive, as did Allied investigators.1 (Soviet 
interrogations of Junge have not yet surfaced.) On her return to Munich she 
gave many statements, most of which are well known to scholars. They include 
a series of interviews in Munich by U.S. Judge Michael Musmanno in February 
and March 1948 when Musmanno was investigating the circumstances of Hitler’s 
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death.2 She also wrote a personal memoir in 1947, made available to scholars 
in Munich’s Institute for Contemporary History and published in 2002.3 She 
gave testimony to German authorities in 1954 as well as numerous interviews 
to journalists in the years after the war, most famously in a 2002 German 
documentary film titled Im toten Winkel (Blind Spot). She died the same year 
at age 81.
On June 9, 1946, the CIC Field Office in Starnberg arrested Junge in Munich, 
and CIC agents interrogated her on June 13 and June 18. On August 30, CIC 
agents interviewed her a third time at the request of British intelligence, this time 
with 15 specific British questions. These summer 1946 interrogations are not 
cited in scholarly works on Hitler’s final days. Possibly released here for the first 
time, they contain occasional detail and nuance that the other statements do not, 
because they were Junge’s first statements on returning to the West.
In the first session Junge recalled Hitler’s personal habits, confirming, 
albeit in new language, what is well known. She recounted Hitler’s withdrawn 
behavior after the German military defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, his 
insistence that Germany’s miracle weapons would end the Allied bombing 
of German cities, and his belief that Providence protected him from the July 
20, 1944, assassination attempt. Junge remembered Hitler saying that if Claus 
von Stauffenberg, the leader of the conspiracy, would have shot Hitler face to 
face instead of using a bomb, then von Stauffenberg would at least be worthy 
of respect. This interrogation also confirmed the death of Nazi Party Secretary 
Martin Bormann by Soviet shelling in Berlin. Hitler’s chauffeur Erich Kempka 
witnessed Bormann’s death and told Junge about it shortly afterwards. In July 
1946 Kempka gave the same story to the International Military Tribunal.4 At the 
time many people thought that Bormann escaped and fled to South America. 
His remains were not discovered until 1999.5 
The second interrogation provides new detail on Junge’s attempted escape 
from Berlin after Hitler’s death, her arrest by the Soviets on June 3, 1945, and her 
repeated interrogations by the Soviets concerning Hitler’s suicide. The Soviets were 
also interested in any connections Junge might have to existing Nazi networks; 
they hoped to use her to uncover them. In September 1945, an unnamed Soviet 
official offered Junge his personal protection including an apartment, food, and 
money. In return, Junge was to cooperate with Soviet forces and not to tell anyone 
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of her former or present job. She was not to leave the Soviet sector; but after she 
contracted diphtheria, she was allowed admission to the hospital in the British 
sector. On leaving the hospital, she said, “the Russians did not take any more 
interest in my person.” She left for Munich and arrived on April 20, 1946.6 
Her third interrogation benefited from the direct questions from the British. 
Junge noted that Hitler hoped to delay his suicide until receiving confirmation 
that the couriers carrying copies of his last political testament had reached their 
recipients, namely Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, whom Hitler appointed head 
of state, and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, whom he appointed army 
commander-in-chief. With the ring closing around his Berlin bunker, Hitler 
would not allow the Soviets to take him alive. But he knew Dönitz, whose 
headquarters was near the Danish border, and Schörner, whose headquarters 
was in Czechoslovakia, would fight until the last cartridge and hang as many 
deserters as need be. “Hitler was uneasy,” recalled Junge, “and walked from one 
room to another. He said that he would wait until the couriers had arrived to 
their destinations with the testaments and then he would commit suicide.”7 The 
couriers were not able to leave the Berlin area. 
The British were also very interested in Hitler’s Gestapo chief, Heinrich Müller, 
who would have offered a treasure trove of counterintelligence information on 
the Soviets. Allied counterintelligence officers failed to locate him after the war. 
Some leads placed him in Berlin at war’s end and others suggested that he had 
fled south. The absence of an arrest or even a corpse led to later conspiracy 
theories that Müller worked for either Allied or Soviet intelligence. The bulk of 
the evidence, pieced together over the next quarter century, indicates that Müller 
was killed in Berlin during the war’s final days.8 
Junge was asked directly: “On what occasions did you see Mueller in the 
Bunker? What do you know of his movements or activities during the last days?” 
Junge did not know Müller personally. She noted that she saw him for the first 
time on April 22, 1945. “Mueller remained in the shelter until Hitler’s death,” she 
said. “I … observed him talking some times (sic) with Hitler….” Junge continued, 
“I do not know any details about his activities. He had taken over the functions 
of [Reich Security Main Office Chief Ernst] Kaltenbrunner….”9 
At the time of Hitler’s suicide, Kaltenbrunner was in Salzburg. He had 
searched for a negotiated peace through various channels while also hoping that 
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an Alpine front could keep Germany from defeat.10 What Hitler knew of these 
efforts in late April 1945 is not clear. But in his political testament he expelled 
Heinrich Himmler from the Nazi Party owing to Himmler’s contacts with the 
Allies. Hitler promoted Karl Hanke, the fanatical Gauleiter of Lower Silesia who 
defended Breslau at the cost of some 40,000 civilian lives, to Himmler’s office of 
Reichsführer-SS. Kaltenbrunner was logically the next in line for Himmler’s job. 
Junge’s statement suggests that Hitler lost trust in Kaltenbrunner, that Müller 
remained loyal to the end, and that Hitler trusted in his loyalty. 
New Documents: Arthur Greiser’s Briefcases
Arthur Greiser, Nazi Gauleiter of the German-annexed portion of western Poland 
called the Warthegau, was a major war criminal by any standard or definition. 
Once conquered by the Germans in 1939, the Warthegau region was to be emptied 
of Jews and Poles and settled with ethnic Germans. The Warthegau also included 
the Lodz ghetto—the second largest in occupied Poland—and the extermination 
facility at Chelmno where Jews were first gassed to death. Thus, Greiser helped to 
implement Nazi policies that killed tens of thousands of expellees as well as more 
than 150,000 mostly Jews in Chelmo itself.11 The U.S. Army captured Greiser in 
Salzburg on May 17, 1945, and extradited him to Poland. Using documents and 
witness testimony, a Supreme National Tribunal in Warsaw tried and convicted 
him in June and July 1946. He was hanged in mid-July.12 
When Greiser fled west in 1945, he carried with him two briefcases filled 
with documents, mostly dealing with his activities during the 1930s and his 
personal affairs. Either he left behind or destroyed documents that connected 
him with policies of mass murder in the Warthegau, or what he kept of those 
documents went to Polish authorities. Still, the U.S. Army retained more than 
2,000 pages of Greiser’s documents in the Investigative Records Repository that 
only now are declassified.13
Some of the most interesting documents involve Greiser’s activities, from 
November 1934 and afterwards, as president of the Senate of the international 
free city of Danzig. This post made Greiser chief executive of a German-
dominated municipal government frequently in conflict with the Polish state 
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that surrounded it. How far to push these conflicts provoked discussion and 
debate among the highest Nazi authorities in Berlin.
Greiser wrote memoranda of his discussions with Hitler, Hermann 
Göring, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, his successor Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, and others. The documents show conflicting views in Berlin about 
how best to deal with the Poles and the League of Nations. Hitler and the Nazi 
Party Gauleiter of Danzig, Albert Forster, often wanted confrontation; Göring 
and Greiser, a more moderate course. Political disagreements help to explain the 
bitter personal rivalry between Greiser and Forster. Greiser’s documents do not 
challenge the reigning historical consensus about these matters, but they do fill 
in the narrative. They also underscore––as historians have long argued––that 
Danzig’s foreign policy was made in Berlin.14 
In 1939 Hitler used conflicts over Danzig as the pretext for Germany 
to invade Poland. After the war, the Allies decided to charge high Nazi 
authorities with crimes against peace; the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg made crimes against peace the central count of four charges 
against high Nazi officials and organizations; the others were war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and conspiracy. The Greiser file contains new 
evidence about the background to German aggression against Poland and 
thus about war crimes. 
The Search for Adolf Eichmann: New Materials
Today, the world knows a great deal about Adolf Eichmann’s escape from Europe 
after the war. While he was living in Argentina under the name of Ricardo Klement, 
Eichmann worked with the Dutch writer Willem Sassen to prepare a memoir of 
sorts. In it Eichmann talks extensively about his escape from Germany. After 
Israeli agents brought Eichmann to Israel in 1960, the authorities interrogated 
him rigorously. Historians have used these plentiful sources as well as earlier 
IWG declassifications.15 The most recent American declassifications fill in some 
small gaps. They show what the West knew about Eichmann’s criminality and his 
postwar movements. No American intelligence agency aided Eichmann’s escape 
or simply allowed him to hide safely in Argentina. 
In 1944, six months before the end of the war, Eichmann reported to Himmler on the exact number of 
Jews killed so far as 6,000,00––4,000,000 in the death camps and an additional 2,000,000 by the death 
squads in Poland and Russia. Hoettl reported Himmler was dissatisfied with the report, asserting the 
numbers must be higher. RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Wartime information emanating from the anti-Nazi informant Fritz Kolbe tied 
Eichmann to the Theresienstadt camp and to the use of Hungarian Jews for slave 
labor.16 In addition, Jewish sources had early postwar information about Eichmann, 
which they passed to the Allies, but much of it was of poor quality, reflecting myths 
that Eichmann or others close to him had spread. One July 1945 report called 
him Ingo Aichmann with an alias of Eichman, and claimed he had been born in 
Palestine in 1901. What Jewish officials knew was that Eichmann had arranged 
transport of Jews from Holland, Denmark, and Hungary.17 This unevaluated report 
and others like it helped establish Eichmann’s importance at a time when his name 
was little known among Allied authorities. Hungarian Jews who had survived, such 
as Rudolph Kastner, could have given plentiful information about Eichmann’s 
activities in Hungary. But they had no idea where Eichmann was. 
Gestapo official Rudolf Mildner noted Eichmann’s skill as a mountaineer 
and gave the Army a list of his possible hiding places in the mountains: either in 
the Dachsteingebiet or the Steiermark and Salzburg area. The Army sent out an 
early October 1945 notice that it wanted Eichmann urgently for interrogation 
and possibly for trial as a war criminal.18
In late October 1945, OSS sources indicated to the Army that Eichmann 
might be hiding in the Steiermark or Salzburg areas. Special Agent John H. 
Richardson asked local Austrian police in Salzburg to arrest Eichmann and turn 
him over to the CIC.19 Although the CIC in Austria had no files on Eichmann 
of its own, it passed along sketchy, mostly accurate information from Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces files.20 The Research Office of the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission issued an October 1945 report on 
Eichmann that reached the Judge Advocate General’s office. It contained some 
detail about Eichmann’s wartime activities.21
In November 1945 the Counter-Intelligence War Room in London issued 
the first substantial Allied intelligence report on Eichmann, drawn from 
interrogations of a number of captured Nazi officials who had known him. It 
offered a physical description and a reasonable account of his career, calling him 
a war criminal of the highest importance. It included what he had told other 
Nazis about the number of Jews murdered by the Nazis and places he and others 
might hide if the war were lost. The report gave details about Eichmann’s family 
and revealed the identity of one of his mistresses.22 
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Today we know that near the end of the war Eichmann had gone to the 
village of Altaussee in Austria. On May 2 he had met with his superior, Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner. More or less according to Kaltenbrunner’s instructions—
Kaltenbrunner probably did not want to be caught with Eichmann––he then 
retreated into the mountains to hide. But then he left. After a visit to Salzburg, 
he tried to slip across the border to Bavaria. American forces arrested him, 
apparently in late May. At first, he used the identity of a corporal named Barth, 
but after his SS tattoo was recognized and U.S. Army officers poked holes in 
his story, he transformed himself into Otto Eckmann, a second lieutenant in 
the Waffen-SS. The Army soon sent him to a POW camp at Weiden, where he 
stayed until August 1945. Then he was moved to another POW camp at Ober-
Dachstetten in Franconia. Some Jewish survivors came to this camp to pick out 
known war criminals, but Eichmann managed to avoid recognition. (The Army 
established a file on an Otto Eckmann, but it is one of a small percentage of IRR 
digital files that cannot be retrieved.) While the Counter-Intelligence War Room 
alerted Allied forces in Europe about Eichmann’s importance, he was hiding 
under a pseudonym at an American camp.23
In January 1946 the CIC recognized that Eichmann was partly responsible 
for the extermination of six million Jews, requested his immediate apprehension, 
and suggested close surveillance of his mistress, who owned a small paper 
factory in a village in the Austrian Alps.24 Renewed war crimes interrogations 
of Eichmann’s associate Wilhelm Höttl and Eichmann’s subordinate Dieter 
Wisliceny convinced prosecutors that Eichmann was still alive. They asked the 
CIC to search for him in and around Salzburg. The CIC did so, but he was long 
gone from the region.25
In December 1945 the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had 
raised the subject of the Nazi extermination of Jews. American prosecutors 
presented and discussed an affidavit by Wilhelm Höttl, who said Eichmann had 
told him that the Nazis killed approximately six million Jews—the first time 
this statistic had appeared. A major article in the New York Times brought the 
name Adolf Eichmann to millions of people.26 Then Eichmann’s subordinate 
Dieter Wisliceny testified in-depth, adding much detail about Eichmann and 
his office.27 
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Hearing about the publicity about him, Eichmann decided to break out of 
the American camp and reinvent himself as Otto Henninger, a businessman. He 
ended up in the British zone of Germany, where he leased some land and raised 
chickens. By the late 1940s the British had no interest in further war crimes trials. 
But when Eichmann heard that Nazi war crimes hunter Simon Wiesenthal had 
instigated a raid on his wife’s home in Austria in 1950, he decided to make use of 
old SS contacts to go to Argentina.28 
In 1952 the Austrian police chief in Salzburg asked the CIC whether it still 
sought Eichmann’s arrest. An official of the 430th CIC detachment in Austria 
noted that Wiesenthal, described as an Israeli intelligence operative, was hunting 
Eichmann and was offering a large reward. In a memo to Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-2, the CIC noted that its mission no longer included the apprehension 
of war criminals, and “it is also believed that the prosecution of war criminals is 
no longer considered of primary interest to U.S. Authorities.” On these grounds, 
the Army should advise the Salzburg police that Eichmann was no longer sought. 
But in view of Eichmann’s reputation and the interest of other countries [Israel] 
in apprehending him, it might be a mistake to show lack of interest. So the CIC 
recommended confirming continuing U.S. interest in Eichmann.29
In 1953 New Jersey Senator H. Alexander Smith acting on behalf of 
Rabbi Abraham Kalmanowitz, a leading figure in the Orthodox Jewish rescue 
organization known as Vaad Ha-Hatzalah, asked the CIA to make an effort 
to find Eichmann. Kalmanowitz viewed him as a threat to world peace. The 
memorandum by the Chief of CIA’s Near East and Africa Division, subunit-2, 
was cleared by CIA General Counsel Larry Houston and stated: “while CIA has 
a continuing interest in the whereabouts and activities of individuals such as 
Eichmann, we are not in the business of apprehending war criminals, hence in 
no position to take an active role in this case; that we would, however, be alert for 
any information regarding Eichmann’s whereabouts and pass it on to appropriate 
authorities (probably the West German Government) for such action as may be 
indicated.”30
By then, contradictory rumors speculated that Eichmann was currently in 
Egypt, Argentina, or Jerusalem, and falsely ascribing his place of birth to the latter 
city. Some CIA reports unknowingly confused Adolf Karl Eichmann with Karl 
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Heinz Eichmann, who reportedly was in Cairo or Damascus. Indistinguishable 
among these false rumors assembled by West German intelligence was 
unconfirmed but accurate information concerning a “Clemens” in Argentina.31
In March 2010 the international press noted that the German intelligence 
service, the BND, had a classified file of some 4,500 pages of documents on 
Eichmann, purportedly about Eichmann’s escape to Italy and then Argentina.32 
American IRR records and CIA records on Eichmann may supplement or serve 
as a check on these German files once they are released.
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CHAPTER TWO  
Nazis and the Middle East
Recent scholarship has highlighted Nazi aims in the Middle East, including the 
intent to murder the Jewish population of Palestine with a special task force that 
was to accompany the Afrika Korps past the Suez Canal in the summer of 1942.1 
Scholars have also re-examined the relationship between the Nazi state and Haj 
Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, as well as the postwar place 
of the Holocaust in Arab and Muslim thinking.2 Newly released CIC and CIA 
records supplement this scholarship in revealing ways.
Einsatzkommando Egypt
The 1946 testimony of Franz Hoth casts interesting light on both Nazi territorial 
objectives and Jewish policy in 1940–42. British troops in Norway captured Hoth, an SS 
and Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service or SD) officer who had served in a number of 
different mobile killing units called Einsatzkommandos.3 When in March 1946 British 
interrogators asked Hoth about the functions of the Einsatzkommandos, he studiously 
avoided giving self-incriminating statements. His interrogator seems to have liked him: 
“Hoth declares—and the interrogator is inclined to believe him—that throughout his 
SD career, he tried to work in accordance with his ideals. It is not thought that Hoth 
would consciously have made himself guilty of any crimes….”4 As a result of this 
generous assessment, his interrogator let him get away with many evasive answers. 
18  |  Nazis and the Middle East
Nevertheless, Hoth gave useful background about the early 1941 training 
of police officers slated for deployment in Africa when Germany expected to 
establish a raw materials empire there. At the Security Police School in Berlin-
Charlottenburg, medical experts, Foreign Office officials, and other experts 
lectured to three classes of about 30 police officers each; additional classes were 
held for non-commissioned officers. “The purpose of these courses was to make 
the students familiar with the history and problems of the former German 
colonies in preparation for the day when these colonies would be retrieved by 
Germany,” Hoth explained. Afterwards, all the German police officers went to 
Rome (April 1941), attending an Italian police school where they learned how 
the Italian police handled resistance in the Italian African colonies.5 
Hoth was friendly with a senior official of the Reich Security Main Office 
(RSHA) named Walter Rauff, one of the inventors and distributors of the gas van 
used to asphyxiate victims in Belarus and later at the Chelmno extermination 
camp. Because of his connection with Rauff, who was slated for command of 
an Einsatzkommando in North Africa, and his colonial training, Hoth was 
appointed head of section I of Rauff ’s Einsatzkommando Egypt, which was 
assembled and dispatched to Athens in July 1942. There the unit waited for 
General Rommel’s troops to conquer Egypt and move into the British-controlled 
Mandate of Palestine, where roughly half a million Jews lived.6 
Rauff ’s Einsatzkommando, technically subordinated to Rommel’s army, 
reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin. After Reinhard Heydrich was assassinated 
in Czechoslovakia, SS chief Heinrich Himmler took direct command of this 
umbrella security-police organization. Two German historians have indicated 
that Himmler conferred with Hitler about the deployment of Einsatzkommando 
Egypt, which was to take “executive measures” against civilians on its own 
authority, in other words, the mass murder of Jews.7 In 1946 Hoth commented 
only that his Einsatzkommando was supposed to perform the usual Security 
Police and SD duties in Egypt; he avoided saying that such duties elsewhere had 
included the mass execution of Jews. But this context puts a rather different light 
on what his British interrogator called Hoth’s idealism.  
Hitler himself signaled his intention to eliminate the Jews of Palestine. In 
a November 28, 1941, conversation in Berlin with Haj Amin al-Husseini, the 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hitler said that the outcome of the war in Europe 
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would also decide the fate of the Arab world. German troops intended to break 
through the Caucasus region and move into the Middle East. This would result 
in the liberation of Arab peoples. Hitler said that Germany’s only objective there 
would be the destruction of the Jews.8
The British never prosecuted Hoth for his Einsatzkommando activities. But 
he had also served in the Security Police in the French city of Nancy, and the 
French military authorities found him guilty of crimes there. He was sentenced 
to death and executed in 1949.9
New Documentation: Haj Amin al-Husseini’s Contract
Recent books have added greatly to our knowledge of Haj Amin al-Husseini’s 
activities as leader of anti-Jewish revolts in the British Mandate in Palestine in 
1929 and 1936, as the impetus behind the pro-German coup in Iraq in April 1941, 
and as a pro-Nazi propagandist in Berlin, broadcasting over German short-wave 
radio to large audiences in the Middle East starting in late 1941.10 CIA and U.S. 
Army files on Husseini offer small pieces of new evidence about his relationship 
with the Nazi government and his escape from postwar justice.
The Nazi government financed Husseini and Rashid Ali el-Gailani, the 
former premier of Iraq who had joined Husseini in Berlin after his failed coup 
in Iraq. After the war Carl Berthold Franz Rekowski, an official of the German 
Foreign Office who had dealt with Husseini, testified that the Foreign Office 
financially supported the two Arab leaders, their families, and other Arabs in 
their entourage who had fled to Germany after the coup. Husseini and Gailani 
determined how these funds were distributed among the others. The CIA file 
on Husseini includes a document indicating that he had a staff of 20–30 men in 
Berlin. A separate source indicates that he lived in a villa in the Krumme Lanke 
neighborhood of Berlin. From spring 1943 to spring 1944, Husseini personally 
received 50,000 marks monthly and Gailani 65,000 for operational expenses. In 
addition, they each received living expenses averaging 80,000 marks per month, 
an absolute fortune. A German field marshal received a base salary of 26,500 
marks per year.11 Finally, Husseini and Gailani received substantial foreign 
currency to support adherents living in countries outside Germany.12
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Through conversations with other Foreign Office officials, Rekowski learned 
that Nazi authorities planned to use both Arab leaders to control their respective 
countries after Germany conquered them. Gailani was an Iraqi nationalist who 
maintained good ties with the German Foreign Office. Husseini, however, was a 
believer in a Pan-Arab state. His closest ties were with the SS. The other Arabs 
were divided into one camp or the other. 
SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Beisner, like Hoth, an officer on Einsatzkom-
mando Egypt, had frequent contact with Husseini during the war.13 Beisner told 
Rekowski that Husseini had good ties with Himmler and with Waffen-SS Gen. 
Gottlob Berger, who handled the recruitment of non-German forces into the 
Waffen-SS. SS leaders and Husseini both claimed that Nazism and Islam had 
common values as well as common enemies—above all, the Jews.14
Another independent source of information on Husseini’s ties with the SS was 
the disaffected and abused wife of a young Egyptian, Dr. Abdel Halim el-Naggar, 
who had worked in Berlin for the German Foreign Office and the Propaganda 
Ministry. An Egyptian named Galal in Berlin edited an Arabic-language periodical 
designed to stir up the Arabs to support Germany, and el-Naggar assisted him in 
1940. By 1941 el-Naggar had his own Arabic publication for Middle Eastern audi-
ences, and in 1942 he took on the additional job of director of Nazi short-wave 
broadcasts to the Near East. After Husseini came to Berlin, he wanted to coop-
erate with el-Naggar on Middle Eastern broadcasts, and for a time they worked 
together successfully. Then el-Naggar established an Islamic Central Institute in 
Berlin. Husseini had wanted to head this institute, and after el-Naggar refused him, 
Husseini used his influence with the SS to get el-Naggar removed from the broad-
casting job.15 
In the fall of 1943 Husseini went to the Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi 
ally, to recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS. During that trip he told the troops 
of the newly formed Bosnian-Muslim 13th Mountain Waffen-SS division that 
the entire Muslim world ought to follow their example. Husseini also organized 
a 1944 mission for Palestinian Arabs and Germans to carry out sabotage and 
propaganda after German planes dropped them into Palestine by parachute. In 
discussions with the Foreign Intelligence branch of the RSHA, Husseini insisted 
that the Arabs take command after they landed and direct their fight against the 
Jews of Palestine, not the British authorities.16 
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Today we have more detailed scholarly accounts today of Husseini’s war-
time activities, but Husseini’s CIA file indicates that wartime Allied intelligence 
organizations gathered a healthy portion of this incriminating evidence. This 
evidence is significant in light of Husseini’s lenient postwar treatment.17 
In the spring of 1945, a German Foreign Office official reached agreement 
with Gailani effective April 1: his cash payments were raised to 85,000 marks, but 
Gailani would repay the Germans after his forces reconquered Iraq. Similarly, 
according to a newly declassified document, the Foreign Office and Husseini 
signed a contract for subsidies of up to 12,000 marks per month to continue 
after April 1, 1945, with the Mufti pledging to repay these amounts later. In April 
1945 neither side could have had much doubt about the outcome of the war. The 
continuing contractual relationships meant that Nazi officials and the two Arab 
leaders hoped to continue their joint or complementary political-ideological 
campaign in the postwar period.18
Declassified CIA and Army files establish that the Allies knew enough about 
Husseini’s wartime activities to consider him a war criminal. Apparently fearing 
Allied prosecution,19 he tried to flee to Switzerland at the end of the war. Swiss 
authorities turned him over to the French, who brought him to Paris. 
Haj Amin al-Husseini’s Escape
Right after the war ended a group of Palestinian-Arab soldiers in the British 
Army who were stationed in Lebanon had staged anti-French demonstrations. 
They carried around a large picture of Husseini and declared him to be the 
“sword of the faith.”20 According to one source considered reliable by the rump 
American intelligence organization known as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), 
British officials objected to French plans to prosecute Husseini, fearing that this 
would cause political unrest in Palestine. The British “threatened” the French 
with Arab uprisings in French Morocco.21 
In October 1945 Arthur Giles (who used the title Bey), British head of 
Palestine’s Criminal Investigation Division, told the assistant American military 
attaché in Cairo that the Mufti might be the only person who could unite the 
Palestine Arabs and “cool off the Zionists…. Of course, we can’t do it, but it 
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might not be such a damn bad idea at that.” French intelligence officials, bitter 
at France’s loss of colonial territory in the Middle East, said they would enjoy 
having the Mufti around to embarrass the British.22
Husseini was well treated in Paris. Meanwhile, Palestinian Arab leaders and various 
Muslim extremists agitated to bring him back to the Middle East. According to the 
American military attaché in Cairo, this plan initially embarrassed moderate officials 
in the Arab League. But as prospects for a peaceful settlement in the British Mandate 
for Palestine declined and as other Arab prisoners were released or escaped (Gailani 
escaped), sentiment changed. A delegate of the Palestine Higher Arab Committee went 
to Paris in June 1946 and told Husseini to get ready for a little trip.23
According to another American source in Syria, at a meeting in the Egyptian 
Embassy in Paris, the ambassador, the ministers of Syria and Lebanon, and a 
few Arab leaders from Morocco and Algeria worked out the details of Husseini’s 
escape. The French government learned of, or was informed of, the plan, but 
chose not to intervene in order to avoid offending the Arabs of North Africa. 
Husseini flew to Syria, then went via Aleppo and Beirut to Alexandria, Egypt.24
By 1947 Husseini denied that he had worked for the Axis powers during the 
war. He told one acquaintance that he hoped soon to have documentary evidence 
rebutting this slander, which the Jews were spreading. Similarly, after Adolf Eichmann 
was brought to Israel for trial in March 1961, Husseini, by now in Beirut, denied 
having ever met Eichmann during the war. He said that he had been forced to take 
refuge in Germany simply because British wanted to capture him. Nazi persecution 
of Jews had served Zionism, according to Husseini, by exciting world sympathy for 
them. Husseini never worked for American intelligence; the CIA simply considered 
him a person worth tracking. He died in Beirut in 1974.25
Wilhelm Beisner, Franz Rademacher, and Alois Brunner
The CIA and the CIC both compiled files on the versatile and French-speaking 
Wilhelm Beisner, who dealt with Husseini during and after the war. It is possible 
to trace Beisner’s long intelligence career better than has been done before. His 
tracks after the war intersected with those of German Foreign Office deportation 
specialist Franz Rademacher, and Adolf Eichmann’s subordinate Alois Brunner. 
All three spent most of their postwar years in the Middle East. 
The CIA diagram shows a nexus of former Nazis––Beisner, Skorzeny, Rademacher, Brunner and Remer — 
with important Arab leaders––the Grand Mufti Hajj Amin el Husseini, Abbass Halim, and Gamal Nasser.
RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency.
Franz Rademacher––linked to the persecution of Jews––fled first to Spain and then to Syria, It is believed 
that Hans Globke, Adenauer’s personal aide, assisted his escape. RG 319, Records of the Army Staff.
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In April 1945 an unnamed German defected to Switzerland and offered up 
Beisner as a war criminal of Allied interest. Although Allen Dulles’s office did 
not trust the informant, they rated his information good.26 According to this 
report, Beisner trained as an agronomist, then went into Alfred Rosenberg’s Nazi 
Party Foreign Policy Office (Aussenpolitisches Amt), becoming a specialist in 
the Balkan region. He was allegedly involved in the Iron Guard’s unsuccessful 
January 1941 coup in Bucharest––a Romanian “Kristallnacht” in which 120 
Jews were brutally murdered. The informant mistakenly placed Beisner as head 
of the Gestapo in Lodz and Zagreb. Beisner did, however, serve a term in the 
Waffen-SS, where he was assigned to the Selbstschutz, a “self-defense” force of 
ethnic Germans used to carry out brutal and murderous policies in German-
occupied Polish territory.27 Although his SS personnel file lacks evidence of it, 
from the spring of 1941 until late that year he served in Croatia as head of an 
Einsatzkommando Zagreb (part of Einsatzgruppe Yugoslavia). Croatian sources 
list him also as German police attaché to the new Independent State of Croatia.28
The Ustaschi government in Croatia admired the SS and was eager to win 
Himmler’s favor, according to the Croatian minister in Berlin.29 The period 
Beisner was in Croatia was precisely the period when the Croatian Ustaschi 
engaged in massive killings of Jews and Serbs. In January 1942 Beisner received 
the German war cross of merit, second class, for his service, and in 1943 the 
Croatian government decorated him as well.30 
At the end of 1941 Beisner joined SD Foreign Intelligence as a specialist in the 
Middle East. Assigned as an officer to Einsatzkommando Egypt, he went to Athens 
to await Rommel’s conquest of Egypt.31 After Rommel’s defeat, he then shifted to 
Tunis, where he commanded a Security Police and SD unit and served as liaison to 
the Grand Mufti.32 He also set up an intelligence network in Tunis, which French 
intelligence sources reported on in some detail. When German forces had to 
evacuate Tunisia, Beisner went to Italy, and he tried to keep his Tunisian network 
running. In fact, he sought intelligence covering the Near East generally.33 
He spent the last part of the war in Italy, where American forces apparently 
captured him. Gehlen Organization sources later said Beisner escaped from American 
internment with French help and then went to work for French intelligence in 
Austria.34 In late 1950 an Austrian official who located Beisner in Munich asked the 
CIA for information about him. A CIA official thought Austrian interest stemmed 
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from their belief that Beisner was working for West German intelligence. The CIA 
post in Karlsruhe reported that Beisner had a business enterprise in Munich named 
Omnia that probably served as cover for French intelligence activities.35
A West German intelligence report in March 1952 indicated that Beisner 
had been involved in black-market arms transactions among Switzerland, Spain, 
and France. Discovery of these activities forced him to go to Cairo, where he 
allegedly continued to work for the French and enjoyed good connections with 
the Americans as well. (CIA did not think much of that last comment.) He 
seems to have been active in purchasing arms for the Egyptian government.36 
Another CIA document indicated that Beisner arrived in Cairo on July 21, 1951, 
as representative of a Hamburg firm called Terramar and that he offered his 
services to the Gehlen Organization.37 
By then other Germans had arrived in Egypt. In December 1952 the West 
German ambassador to Egypt, speaking to the press in Bonn, drew a clear 
distinction between German military advisers in Egypt and former Nazis in 
certain Middle Eastern countries linked with Haj Amin al-Husseini; these Nazis 
were working to impair relations between Arab states and West Germany, incite 
disturbances, and spread chaos.38 
In Cairo, Beisner did resume contact with Haj Amin al-Husseini. Al-Husseini 
helped him get a visa for a Polish Jew named Hertslett, who worked with Beisner 
in the Egyptian Continental Trading Company, a firm involved in arms deals and 
illicit traffic. According to information CIA received through an Italian business 
contact of Beisner, Prime Minister Najib of Egypt used Beisner to negotiate a 
large purchase of machine guns and cannons, which were to be routed through 
Spain if the United States did not object.39 Later that year, the economic section 
of the American Embassy in Egypt warned that the Egyptian Continental Trading 
Company had a bad reputation. Beisner and Hertslett had tried to pass themselves 
off as working on behalf of the West German government to foster trade between 
West Germany and Egypt; they were now blacklisted and had little means.40 The 
CIA had no direct contact with Beisner. Most of the CIA’s information about his 
Egyptian activities originated with the Gehlen Organization.41 
In 1954 the CIC received a report that Beisner was running Egyptian 
intelligence operations for an organization called the Institute for Contemporary 
Research (Institut für Gegenwartsforschung). This institute was likely connected 
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with a shadowy West German intelligence organization run by Friedrich Wilhelm 
Heinz called the Amt Blank. The CIC checked Beisner’s SS Personnel records at 
the Berlin Document Center, but they were fragmentary.42
Beisner’s importance grew in February 1958 when Franz Rademacher, living 
in Damascus under a pseudonym, told an unnamed CIA source in Syria that 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (called Jamal Nasir in one document and Gamal Nasir in 
another) had worked for the Germans during the war, and that Beisner had 
served as his liaison. They still were close, Rademacher claimed.43 
After leading a revolution and becoming the second president of Egypt 
in 1956, Nasser had established an intelligence organization under Zakaria 
Mohieddin. Zakaria had chosen Beisner’s former RSHA comrade Joachim 
Deumling as his intelligence adviser. Deumling had worked for the British Army 
of the Rhine after the war, but the British blacklisted him for security reasons in 
1951.44 When he decided to leave West Germany for Egypt, he traveled secretly 
to avoid attracting British attention. Zakaria, who soon became minister of the 
interior as well, praised Deumling’s intelligence work in Egypt.45 
Beisner may have benefited from an increasing presence of former Nazis 
in Cairo under Nasser. He later claimed that while in Cairo he had helped to 
train Algerian volunteers for the struggle to liberate Algeria from French control 
and that he sold arms to the Algerian National Liberation Front.46 Whether he 
operated on his own or with Egyptian intelligence approval is unclear.
In March 1958 an unnamed CIA source contacted Beisner through Rademacher 
in Syria nominally to get assistance on a possible contract to build radar stations in 
Saudi Arabia. Impressed with Beisner’s acumen, the man asked the CIA if it would 
like him to pursue a business relationship with Beisner. CIA officials saw a number 
of unanswered questions about Beisner and concluded that the source could pursue 
a business relationship with him without any Agency involvement.47
Rademacher’s own route to the Middle East was convoluted. In 1952 West 
German authorities had lodged charges against Rademacher for his involvement 
in the murder and deportation of Jews in several countries. Although acquitted of 
many of the charges in spite of substantial evidence against him, he was sentenced 
to three years for his role in arranging deportations of Jews from Serbia and eight 
months for being an accessory to similar activity in Belgium. After West German 
authorities released him on bail during his appeal, he went into hiding, eventually 
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fleeing to Spain and then Syria.48 In 1957 Rademacher hinted to a right-wing 
German with good contacts in Syria that Konrad Adenauer’s aide Hans Globke, 
with whom Rademacher had worked during the war, had assisted his flight from 
West Germany. He also claimed a good connection with the chief of Syrian 
intelligence. His formal position in Damascus was partner in the import-export 
firm of Souheb Mahmoudy, and he used the name of a Spaniard, Bartolomé 
Rossello. The CIC source mentioned Rademacher’s contacts with a “Beischner” 
and an “Otto Fischer,” about whom Rademacher was unwilling to say much.49 
By 1959 the CIA had tentatively concluded that Beisner was a source for West 
German intelligence. A high BND official codenamed Winterstein conceded that 
the BND had a loose relationship with Beisner, meaning it had contact with 
him, but could not really direct him or his activities. But the BND kept in mind 
that, given his frequent travels and contacts, it was likely Beisner had a close 
connection with Egyptian intelligence.50
In October 1960, while in Munich, where his wife kept an apartment, Beisner 
was wounded when a bomb exploded in his car. West German police speculated 
that the French terrorist organization called the Red Hand had carried out the 
attack. A BND official told CIA that, in his personal opinion, Beisner worked 
for Egyptian intelligence, and that the Red Hand had arranged the explosion. 
Beisner’s vision was damaged, and he lost a leg. Today, we know that the Red 
Hand was a unit sponsored by the French Intelligence (Documentation and 
External Counterespionage Service or SDECE) to carry out assassinations and 
attacks against the Algerian liberation movement.51 
By then, Beisner had fallen into disfavor in Egypt, possibly because of 
general distrust of foreigners, or more likely because of dissatisfaction with how 
he had handled commissions on his arms deals.52 As a result of his difficulties, 
Beisner wrote a man using the name Georg Fischer or Rischer in Damascus to 
see whether he would be welcome in Syria. In his handwritten reply, “Rischer” 
said that his friends would be happy to talk with Beisner face-to-face, and he 
himself would be pleased to see Beisner. “Rischer” also complained about a 
recent article that slandered Egypt, Syria, and their leading officials. He said it 
very much resembled Zionist propaganda against Nazi Germany after 1936!53
An intelligence agency intercepted the mail to Alice Beisner’s Munich 
apartment and passed copies to the CIA. (Although the BND said that it was 
Nazis and the Middle East  |  29
a French intercept operation, the CIA thought that the BND itself might have 
done it.) As a result, the CIA read “Rischer’s” reply. CIA officials concluded, after 
comparing handwriting, that Rischer was really Alois Brunner, Adolf Eichmann’s 
onetime subordinate, who was now serving as an adviser to Syrian intelligence. 
In subsequent correspondence Rischer strongly recommended that Beisner read 
Simon Wiesenthal’s new book I Hunted Eichmann.54
CIA officials received other indications that Fischer/Rischer was Brunner.55 
A CIA official in Munich had an informal discussion in March 1961 with a 
BND official codenamed Glueckrath, who claimed that a grand council of 
the Egyptian SS group had met several times in late 1960 and January 1961. 
Brunner had attended, along with Fritz Katzmann, former Higher SS and 
Police Leader in Galicia, who had gone into hiding at the end of the war and 
escaped justice. Other participants named were former Nazi propagandist 
Johannes von Leers, a major from Egyptian intelligence, and a lieutenant 
colonel from the Egyptian Ministry of Information. At this meeting Brunner 
claimed to possess a long list of Jews who had collaborated with the Nazis 
during the Final Solution; they could now be blackmailed to help finance the 
SS group. Von Leers said that if this blackmail failed, he at least wanted to 
publish the list.56
Beisner ended up resettling in Tunis, not Damascus. CIA last traced him 
there in 1966, still wheeling and dealing. Rademacher was put on the payroll of 
the West German Secret Service sometime in 1961 or early 1962. The CIA was 
aware of Rademacher’s status with the BND and interested in his activities, but 
had no direct contact with him.57 
After France intercepted a shipment of arms to Algerian liberation forces, 
Rademacher was suspected of having leaked the information. Syrian authorities 
arrested him for spying. Thrown into prison, he was released in 1965 because of 
poor health—he had suffered two heart attacks in prison. He decided to return 
to West Germany in September 1966, where he was tried again, convicted, and 
given a five-year sentence. However, the judges gave him more than full credit 
for time served in American internment after the war. He died as a free man 
in 1973.58 Alois Brunner survived an assassination attempt and remained in 
Syria––the last member of Adolf Eichmann’s team. He apparently died there 
in 1992.59 
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Beisner, Rademacher, Brunner, Deumling, and a number of other former SS 
and police officials found not only havens, but postwar employment in Middle 
Eastern countries. There they were able to carry on and transmit to others Nazi 
racial-ideological anti-Semitism. Beisner, Rademacher, and particularly Brunner 
played important roles in the systematic killing of millions of Jews, and they 
continued to fulminate about Jewish influence decades later. 
Much of the evidence of their postwar influence in Middle Eastern 
countries comes from their own statements. Driven by Nazi obsessions, these 
men never had a clear grasp of objective political realities, and they may also 
have exaggerated their postwar influence. Others who talked about them are far 
from perfect sources. Still, these intelligence reports, cross-checked against each 
other, are all the documentary sources we have about them. Perhaps one day the 
opening of archives in Middle Eastern countries will allow further insight into 
how far their influence went.
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CHAPTER THREE  
New Materials on Former Gestapo Officers
Gestapo officers, who also held ranks in the SS, were in the U.S. Army 
Counterintelligence Corps’s automatic arrest category after the war. Initially, 
the CIC viewed them as security threats because they could arrange continued 
clandestine resistance against the occupation. Later, CIC used former Gestapo 
officers to garner useful intelligence for the postwar period on everything from 
German right-wing movements to underground communist organizations. 
Intelligence officers often overlooked the significant role Gestapo officers played 
in the murder of Jews, POWs, and the political enemies of the Nazis. 
More than 25 years ago Allan A. Ryan, author of the 1983 official U.S. 
Government study of the Klaus Barbie case, noted that a growing number of 
Gestapo personnel were released from U.S. captivity in 1946 and 1947 and “their 
apparent use grew, although to what extent is uncertain.”1 The newly released 
records provide a much fuller picture regarding the American use of Gestapo 
officers. The CIC went to some lengths to protect certain persons from justice. 
The following cases are representative.
Rudolf Mildner’s Escape from Justice
Rudolf Mildner was originally arrested as part of a search for Nazi officials who 
might lead an underground Nazi resistance. On May 21, 1945, the Counter-
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Intelligence War Room in London asked Allied forces in the field to learn from 
captured Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) members what instructions they had 
been given for continued activity after Germany’s defeat. In the weeks ahead the 
War Room learned that important Gestapo officials had concentrated around Hof 
near Munich, Salzburg, and Innsbruck in the war’s final days.2 On May 30, 1945, 
the 80th CIC detachment in the Austrian Alps captured Mildner, a senior Gestapo 
official. He claimed that he was climbing for recreation and that he had intended to 
surrender to the Americans.3 It was the first of many misrepresentations.
A native Austrian with radical rightist sympathies, Mildner received a law degree 
in 1934. In July of the same year, the illegal Austrian Nazi movement assassinated 
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. Afterwards, Mildner fled Austria for Munich. Reinhard 
Heydrich, then head of the Gestapo, hired him to investigate other Austrians who 
had crossed into Germany to determine who was reliable. Mildner later claimed that 
Heydrich forced him to remain in the German police, but Heydrich would not have 
trusted a reluctant officer for such duty. Mildner, in fact, became deputy chief of the 
Gestapo in Linz, Hitler’s hometown, after Germany annexed Austria in March 1938.4 
U.S. authorities knew that Mildner was a long-standing Gestapo member 
but never pressed him for details on the Gestapo’s crimes against Jews or anyone 
else.  Mildner simply misled them. In discussing his functions late in the war as 
acting chief of Vienna’s Security Police, he mentioned that he left untouched 
Vienna’s remnant of 15,000 Jews.5  He hardly deserved credit. Nazi authorities 
never decided what to do with Jews in mixed marriages in Germany owing to 
“Aryan” partners’ reactions, which included a major protest in Berlin in February 
1943.6 But U.S. Army Capt. Andrew R. Pickens found Mildner cooperative and 
possessing a good memory. The War Room told the CIC that “it is not thought 
that his information of Amt IV [Gestapo] is likely to be of outstanding interest 
as it seems probably that his service at the RSHA was merely marking time.”7
Mildner left out large parts of his career. As head of the Jewish section of the 
Vienna Gestapo from 1941–43, he signed orders confiscating the property of some 
10,000 Viennese Jews deported to Auschwitz.8 As Gestapo chief in Katowice in East 
Upper Silesia from 1941 to 1943, he was responsible for the execution of hundreds, 
if not thousands, of suspected Polish resisters. Mildner gave them one-minute 
“trials” in the infamous Block 11 of Auschwitz concentration camp that resulted in 
shooting or hanging. He came to Auschwitz frequently for this purpose.9 
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Mildner also failed to mention that he had been commander of the Security 
Police and SD in Denmark in the fall of 1943 when Hitler and Himmler 
ordered Denmark’s 8,000 Jews arrested and deported to Auschwitz. Denmark’s 
Jews escaped this fate owing to the courageous German naval attaché, Georg 
Duckwitz, who leaked Berlin’s intentions to Danish officials, leading to a mass 
escape to Sweden. Finally, Mildner said nothing about his serving as deputy chief 
of the RSHA office over Adolf Eichmann in the spring of 1944 when Eichmann 
and his task force went to Hungary to arrange the deportation of hundreds of 
thousands of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.
Bits of the truth slowly emerged from Mildner’s associates, some of them 
were also captured and interrogated. Karl Ebner, a former deputy, told the British 
that Mildner approved the execution of a British agent dropped by parachute 
near Vienna in mid-1944.10 Franz Joseph Huber, Mildner’s one-time superior as 
Security Police Inspector for the Vienna region, admitted visiting Dachau in 1936, 
Sachsenhausen in 1936, and Mauthausen in 1939. But, he said, he had never seen 
any cruelty there, that the laws of humanity were always his highest rule of conduct, 
and that he never believed in blind obedience or foolhardy resistance.11 The main 
Allied interest in Huber centered on the whereabouts of Gestapo Chief Heinrich 
Müller.12 The Allies were still trying to determine whether Müller had died in the 
last days of the war.13  
Because Mildner mentioned a mid-April 1945 order from Heinrich Himmler 
through RSHA chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner to prepare for postwar underground 
resistance, he was a potentially useful witness against Kaltenbrunner and the SS 
generally at the Trial of the Major War Criminals in Nuremberg. On October 1 the 
CIC turned him over to the U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. It recommended 
his internment after he had served his purpose at Nuremberg, presumably because 
his SS rank made him liable to automatic arrest. But Army Intelligence (G-2) 
Headquarters, which had not cleared his transfer to Nuremberg, complained to CIC 
that they wanted additional access. The Judge Advocate General’s office agreed to 
notify G-2 when Mildner was finished at Nuremberg.14 
While Mildner was in Nuremberg, the Military Intelligence Service Center 
issued an interim report about him. It deserves attention mostly for its conclusions 
and final comments about Mildner’s last weeks in Vienna. The analysts found 
that Mildner had not done anything to set up an underground movement that 
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might cause postwar problems.  They considered his memory excellent, thought 
he had spoken freely, and considered him reliable. The short final interrogation 
report on Mildner, dated January 11, 1946, broke no new ground, calling him 
reliable and very cooperative. The Army sent a copy of this report to the FBI.15
In the meantime, war crimes investigators at Nuremberg examined 
Mildner’s career more carefully. Former subordinates from Katowice testified 
that he had ordered the execution of 500–600 Poles at Auschwitz. When Mildner 
learned about this evidence in late January 1946, he broke down, refused to 
eat, and showed signs of depression. When examined by American psychiatrist 
Leon Goldensohn, he rationalized: “Suppose you Americans were in Germany 
fighting Russia, and some Germans sabotaged you, or shot your soldiers, or stole. 
You’d hang them. And rightly so. So to preserve order and prevent sabotage, the 
Germans in Poland and Silesia had to do that too.”16
A Danish lawyer also interviewed Mildner at Nuremberg about his time in 
Denmark. Mildner accentuated the positive, claiming that Gestapo Chief Müller 
ordered him to arrest the Nobel Prize–winning atomic physicist Niels Bohr. In 
the fall of 1943 Bohr was in jeopardy partly because he was half-Jewish. But 
Berlin also recognized his scientific importance, and the Gestapo in Denmark 
received an order from Berlin to arrest him specifically. A German woman 
working for the Gestapo who had seen the order tipped off Mrs. Bohr’s brother-
in-law. The Bohrs fled across the Kattegat to Sweden shortly before the mass 
flight of Danish Jews there.17 Mildner mentioned the arrest order, but said that 
he had refused to arrest Bohr. In Mildner’s retelling, this allowed Bohr’s escape. A 
Danish newspaper published this far-fetched account on March 21.18  
Ironically the OSS learned back in 1944 how substantial Mildner’s role in 
Denmark actually was. A Danish policeman who went to Sweden compiled 
a detailed report on the German police in Denmark, which reached the OSS 
in April 1944.  The report discounted the role of Higher SS and Police Leader 
Günter Pancke, nominally the top police executive there, because he was 
frequently absent. Mildner, said the report, was the dominant police official. 
Mildner’s deputy Dr. Hoffmann supervised a concentration camp at Horseröd.19 
But by October 1945 the OSS was dissolved, and the information never reached 
the Army or War Crimes officials in Europe. (It was not declassified until 2000.)
In April 1946 Nuremberg prosecutors interrogated Mildner about 
Kaltenbrunner. As before, Mildner incriminated Kaltenbrunner for his efforts 
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to organize last ditch resistance. In mid-April 1945 Kaltenbrunner had ordered 
him and others to set up a network of SD and Gestapo agents and saboteurs 
to operate behind enemy lines at war’s end.20 Around the same time, former 
Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Höss also testified at Nuremberg. Höss noted 
that he had showed Mildner the entire camp including the gas chambers and 
crematoria. Mildner was quite interested, Höss said, because he was deporting 
Jews from Katowice to Auschwitz.21  It was a most damning account.
In April 1946 the British requested Mildner’s extradition, probably because of 
the case of the executed British agent. CIC said it had no further interest in him and 
did not object to extradition. A cryptic handwritten note on the memo indicated 
that he was placed in Rogues Galley on May 4.22 In June Danish intelligence wanted 
to pose more questions to Mildner about the case of Niels Bohr.  How much did 
Nazi authorities know about Bohr, and why didn’t Mildner arrest him? The Danes 
sent a list of questions for American authorities to put to Mildner.  But, according 
to CIC records, on August 11, 1946, Mildner escaped from Civilian Internment 
Camp #409 in Nuremberg. By the time Poland also requested his extradition in 
December, his file indicates that his location was unknown.23 
While in U.S. custody, Mildner described every branch and stem of Vienna’s 
Gestapo organization. A broad sample of other captured Vienna policemen also gave 
details to the Military Intelligence Research Service in Austria about their organization 
and their fellow officers. In November 1946 the Military Intelligence Service put out 
a 142-page report on the Gestapo in Vienna. Army Intelligence in Austria received 
11 copies; the 430th CIC detachment in Austria received 19 copies; the Office of U.S. 
Chief of Counsel (for War Crimes) received a single copy. Tracking and punishing 
war criminals were not high among the Army’s priorities in late 1946.24  
One must infer why the U.S. Army put in such effort to reconstruct Gestapo 
organizational charts. Occupying parts of Germany and Austria, U.S. forces 
needed to keep order, and any diehard Nazi police forces represented a threat. On 
the other hand, more pragmatic German policemen who had dealt with security 
issues such as Communist espionage or subversion might have useful skills and 
detailed knowledge.  The Army initially seemed to consider Mildner one of the 
useful officials. Whether the CIC’s lenient treatment of Mildner contributed in 
some way to his ability to escape will remain unknown unless more information 
surfaces. There is one suggestive source: Nuremberg psychiatrist Leon Goldensohn 
believed Mildner remained in American custody until 1949.25 It is possible that 
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in return for his services, U.S. forces protected Mildner against extradition. In 
1949, like a number of other Nazi war criminals, Mildner went to Argentina. He 
later crossed paths there with his former colleague Adolf Eichmann.26
  
The Gestapo and the Struggle Against Communism: 
The Gestapo in Baden
In the spring of 1947 a CIC agent named Robert S. Taylor from CIC Region IV 
(Munich) recruited Klaus Barbie, the one-time Gestapo Chief of Lyon (1942–
44). Barbie helped run a counterintelligence net named “Büro Petersen” which 
monitored French intelligence. In 1948 Barbie helped the CIC locate former 
Gestapo informants. In 1949–50, he penetrated German Communist Party 
(KPD) activities in CIC Region XII (Augsburg). Unaware of Barbie’s initial hiring 
in 1947, CIC headquarters was ambivalent about retaining him. Regardless, 
he continued to work for the CIC in return for protection against French war 
crimes charges. The story of his escape to South America with the help of the 
CIC, after French authorities began to make inquiries as to his whereabouts in 
1951, is well known. 27
The latest batch of CIC records has more information about the process 
of hiring Gestapo officials. Allan Ryan quotes a CIC headquarters June 7, 1949, 
directive from Maj. Earl Browning titled “Brief and Policy for the Interrogation 
and Exploitation of Gestapo Personnel.” It called for the reinterrogation of Gestapo 
specialists regarding KPD methods and possible agents that could be used within 
the KPD itself. But the directive had limits. “It is the policy of this Headquarters,” 
Browning wrote, “to discourage the use of Gestapo personnel as further sources 
of this organization except in unusual circumstances.”28 Either this directive was 
frequently disregarded, or there were a lot of unusual circumstances.
Approximately 1,200 newly released files relate to the penetration of 
German Communist activities and specifically to “Project Happiness,” the CIC’s 
codename for counterintelligence operations against the KPD. A smaller number 
of files relate specifically to the location of and use of Gestapo personnel as agents 
and informants in the different CIC regions. The example of the Baden region 
in West Germany suggests that the CIC’s relationship with Gestapo officers 
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depended partly on the individuals involved. Some former Gestapo officers were 
more willing to cooperate than others. 
In August 1949 CIC Headquarters requested organizational charts of the 
Gestapo in Baden (CIC Region II) in order to exploit former Gestapo Communist 
experts there.29 In 1945 CIC had undertaken studies based on interrogations 
of arrested Gestapo members, but these studies were organizational in nature 
and were handicapped by the fact that in many cities, Heidelberg for instance, 
Gestapo officers received orders to burn their records.30 Regional CIC officers now 
reconstructed Gestapo personnel lists for the major cities including Mannheim, 
Heidelberg, and Karlsruhe. They included potential Communist experts from 
the Gestapo, together with up-to-date addresses and notes on Gestapo personnel 
who might have fled south to the French occupation zone.
Some Gestapo personnel in northern Baden had already been sentenced for 
war crimes. Hermann Boschert of the Karlsruhe Gestapo was serving a life sentence 
(subsequently shortened) for his role in the murder of an escaped British POW even 
though, in the CIC’s assessment, he “may be termed an expert on communism.”31 
Eugen Feucht of the Heidelberg Gestapo “was the most active man in the political 
field,” according to former Gestapo co-workers. In 1949 he was serving a three-year 
prison term for his wartime activities. Regardless, special agent Fred C. Hicks noted 
that “[I] will make an attempt to contact Feucht in the very near future.”32 
Others refused to talk for fear of self-incrimination. “A burned child avoids 
fire,” said Hermann Kraut, the former head of the Baden Gestapo’s Referat 
N (which managed and registered informants), who worked in 1950 as a 
watchmaker, “and for that reason I won’t do any more political work.” Kraut told 
the CIC that he “had been contacted numerous times by an American civilian 
organization … but that he refused to work for that organization, regardless of 
how much they would pay him.”33 Johann Oettinger had been in charge of the 
Gestapo in Heidelberg but claimed to have no contact with any of his office’s 
former informants. Special Agent Hicks wrote that, “Oettinger does not want to 
give any information to this office.”34
The efforts of Special Agent Ralph Kahn in Mannheim, well documented 
in the new records, suggest expanded use of former Gestapo personnel to 
penetrate the KPD. In 1949 Kahn contacted every former Gestapo officer of 
possible value in Mannheim. He had mixed success. Fritz Michel was, according 
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to former colleagues, “the most capable man the local Gestapo had in the leftist 
political field after 1933.” At first, Michel was unwilling to help owing to “the 
harsh treatment he allegedly received during his internment in Ludwigsburg….” 
Kahn noted that, “he was very cold toward this agent when the first contacts were 
made.” Kahn persevered. “Only after many visits,” Kahn reported on December 
19, 1949, “did [Michel] slowly warm up and begin to talk.”
“You think that we had the Mannheim KPD penetrated,” Michel told Kahn in 
mid-December, “but that is not the case. We had no penetration in Mannheim at 
any time from 1933 to 1945.” “We had some lucky breaks in Mannheim,” Michel 
continued, “and were able to get some good cases, but we did not get them through 
any ‘Spitzels’ [police spies] whom we had placed within the party.” Michel said that 
the Mannheim Gestapo depended on routine denunciations. “The Gestapo,” he 
said, “had at times some voluntary informants who did not like some person, and 
from these leads, we could occasionally get a fairly good case.” The Gestapo arrested 
the occasional KPD functionary and then “worked on him” until he gave up more 
names of active KPD members. This, Michel said, was how the Mannheim Gestapo 
destroyed the communist resistance circle under Georg Lechleiter in 1942, a case 
that led to 31 arrests and 19 executions including that of Lechleiter himself.35 Michel 
told Kahn that he knew many KPD functionaries in the Mannheim area, but was 
“allegedly not able to give any names as to who could be recruited as informants.”36 
Kahn repeatedly contacted Adolf Gerst, the former head of the Mannheim 
Gestapo, who was subject to murder charges. Gerst later received a seven-year 
sentence for aggressive interrogations that ended in death.37 Gerst claimed little 
contact with former informants because, as he said, “his agents usually contacted 
the informants.” Kahn reported that he “made a strenuous effort” to obtain 
employment for Gerst’s son, also named Adolf, who had just been released from 
prison by the French for his role in the Gestapo in Saarbrücken. Kahn reported 
that “this did not persuade Gerst to give information….”38 
In August 1949 the CIC learned that Alois Bischoff, “an expert on 
communism,” had been from late 1943 to 1945 the head of Mannheim’s 
Referat-N and “was considered the key, and most capable man of this Referat.” 
Kahn located him after his denazification hearings. Bischoff was unemployed 
and still a believer in National Socialism––he had joined the Party in 1927.39 
Bischoff refused to incriminate himself or give information on right-wing 
groups “because of his former party activities and his belief in that party.” But 
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he was pleased to provide information on the political left. “An offer to pay 
[Bischoff] for his time spent in talking … about former informants or contacts, 
was emphatically refused….” Bischoff thus revealed for free that Referat N 
had numerous carded informants within illegal party organizations, including 
Gerhard Jakobshagen, an SPD member of the former Baden State Parliament, 
who had contacts in the KPD and provided information of illegal SPD activity. 
He also noted, contrary to Michel’s assertion, that the Gestapo had an informant 
who helped with the Lechleiter case. Kahn followed these leads further and 
maintained the relationship with Bischoff.40
The Cases of Eugen Fischer and Anton Mahler
The cases of Eugen Fischer and Anton Mahler, two senior Gestapo officers in 
Munich and Augsburg, demonstrate similarities to the Barbie case. Historians 
have known since the 1980s that the CIC had relationships with them. But their 
CIC files provide many new details.41 
Both men were career policemen before 1933. Fischer joined the Bavarian 
police in Munich in 1924 and had engaged in intelligence and political work. 
He joined the Nazi Party in 1934 and served in the Munich Gestapo from 1936 
forward.42 Mahler joined the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in 1933 and served in the 
Augsburg Gestapo from 1938 to 1941. From December 1941 to February 1945, 
he was part of the Munich Gestapo then transferred back to Augsburg until the 
end of the war.43 During the war they served together in Gestapo section IV A, 
where they investigated high treason cases by the illegal KPD. 
Mahler is of interest for two other reasons. He was the chief interrogator 
of Hans Scholl, a leading member of the White Rose, a student organization 
in Munich that decried German apathy and called for Hitler’s overthrow 
through the secret distribution of leaflets. Hans and his sister Sophie Scholl 
were convicted of high treason and beheaded in February 1943. From May to 
November 1941, Mahler also served in Einsatzgruppe B in occupied Belarus, 
which participated in the killings of more than 45,000 people, most of them 
Jews, by mid-November 1941.44 It is not clear what Mahler did in Belarus. 
Einsatzgruppe B began its campaign with 665 members.45 This admission 
on his own U.S. Military Government questionnaire in 1947 was ignored or 
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overlooked by U.S. and West German authorities, and Mahler never mentioned 
it subsequently.
In the automatic arrest category, both men were apprehended shortly after 
the war.46 Fischer was originally placed in the War Crimes enclosure in Dachau, 
but the authorities lacked evidence of his crimes. He was moved to Moosberg 
labor enclosure pending denazification proceedings. 
In August 1947 CIC Region IV (Munich) discovered that Fischer had been in 
Gestapo Office IV A 2 (Counter-Sabotage). “It is assumed,” noted Lt. Col. L. M. 
de Riemer, the commanding officer of the 970th CIC Detachment on August 26, 
1947, “that many old KPD members who were known to [Fischer] are presently 
active in important positions,” and “that [Fischer] could be helpful in supplying 
many details.” “It is highly urgent” he added, “that CIC Region IV have access 
to the information [Fischer] can supply before he meets the Denazification 
Board. This information cannot be solicited while [Fischer] is confined in the 
Internment Center.”47 The U.S. Military Government (OMGUS) had to approve 
his release. Region IV asked that Fischer receive a one-month furlough. OMGUS’s 
Public Safety Branch agreed to release Fischer for one month, on the condition 
that any help for the CIC not affect his pending denazification hearing.48 Fischer 
went through denazification but emerged unscathed.49
After Fischer’s furlough became indefinite in January 1948, the CIC incorporated 
him into Project Happiness. He worked in the Augsburg and Munich regions, first 
as part of Barbie’s Petersen net, and then as an independent source for various CIC 
special agents. By all accounts he was valuable. An experienced police officer, he had 
numerous contacts in city and state police in Bavaria, and as a former Gestapo officer, 
he maintained contact with former Gestapo sources. He thus developed extensive 
contacts and penetrated city and state police offices, various civil agencies, private 
concerns, and even right-wing political groups in order to investigate KPD penetration 
of these organizations. In 1949 he was responsible for written reports on KPD activities 
in the MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nürnberg) factory in Augsburg, the KPD 
penetration of the Augsburg city police, as well as reports on the Soviet zone.50 
At the same time Fischer was a security hazard. Maj. Henry V. Ida of CIC Region 
XII (Augsburg) pointed to the “undesirability of hiring former Gestapo agents 
as full time “X” type informants.” Ignoring the basics of compartmentalization, 
the CIC allowed Fischer to be handled by three separate agents, including Special 
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Agent Erhard Dabringhaus, who handled Barbie as of June 1948 and had a 
reputation for lax security. Fischer became familiar with general CIC practices in 
the Augsburg and Munich regions and with the identities of numerous older and 
newer sources used by more than one CIC Regional office. Because of Fischer’s 
extensive knowledge of CIC sources and methods, Ida worried that “dropping 
[Fischer] at this time may do more harm than good.” 
Instead, Ida began to shift Fischer’s activities away from Project Happiness 
to “projects of less sensitivity and importance,” such as the “investigation of the 
activities of former Gestapo, SS and NSDAP officials.” Region XII also tried to 
learn Fischer’s own sub-sources as well as what Fischer knew of CIC sources and 
methods. This task was difficult owing to Fischer’s “extreme reluctance to submit 
sufficient information regarding his sub-sources…. Overly precipitous action in 
this respect will make [Fischer] aware that he is being ‘debriefed.’”51 
Mahler’s case was similar to Fischer’s. Released from U.S. detention in 
September 1948, Mahler faced denazification in Augsburg almost immediately.52 
He intended to protect himself in the proceeding by naming Max Lappler, a local 
KPD functionary, as a wartime Gestapo informant. Lappler was now working as an 
informant for Fischer. To protect Mahler and his source within the KPD, Fischer 
wrote the U.S. authorities in hopes of postponing Mahler’s denazification hearing, 
adding that, “the KPD had a definite political interest in eliminating former Gestapo 
officials who were specialists in Communist questions, through the Spruchkammer 
[Denazification Courts].”53 Mahler’s hearing labeled him an “Activist” (i.e., not a 
“Major Offender”). Still, he immediately appealed the finding with the argument 
that the hearing was politically inspired by the local KPD. The Spruchkammer 
decision was nullified on September 24, 1949, though the circumstances are 
unclear.54 Mahler’s restraint in mentioning old Gestapo sources made him suitable 
for intelligence work.55 His resumé, submitted to the CIC, mentioned his work 
against Communists in the Gestapo and omitted his service in Einsatzgruppe B. 
CIC Region XII used Mahler as an informant beginning in February 1949. 
By May, he was a full-time employee at Region XII, performing secretarial duties 
and holding daily discussions with Special Agent Herbert Bechtold about the 
KPD and its methods. At the same time, Mahler worked for Fischer. He received 
300 marks per month plus cigarettes, coffee, soap, and razor blades. It was an 
improvement over his first postwar job as a construction laborer.56 
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The KPD was not finished with Fischer and Mahler. In November 1949, 
members of the KPD in Munich aided by the Union of Nazi Persecutees (VVN)––an 
organization with communist connections––brought criminal complaints against 
each to the Bavarian State Court in Munich. Based on information from their 
sources within the KPD, Fischer and Mahler argued to their U.S. handlers that the 
criminal complaints were politics by other means––an effort by the KPD to eliminate 
their former Gestapo adversaries through criminal trials when denazification had 
not done the job. The KPD, according to Fischer’s sources, also understood that 
this case would expose the U.S.  agencies that were protecting Fischer and Mahler, 
while eliminating the two former Gestapo anti-Communist operatives. The VVN, 
said Fischer, prepared the case by rounding up additional witnesses through 
advertisements, even if the ads could provide nothing but hearsay from family 
members of alleged victims. The VVN hoped that the sheer bulk of witnesses, 
together with an intimidating crowd in the courtroom, would result in convictions. 
According to Fischer and Mahler, the KPD even tried to recruit their former Security 
Police colleagues as prosecution witnesses, offering to vouch for them during their 
own denazification hearings should they testify against Fischer and Mahler.
CIC Region IV told CIC headquarters that Fischer and Mahler should be 
protected from politically inspired criminal proceedings: 
….either of them may have been forced [in the Gestapo] to use methods 
of interrogation which are not condoned as regular practice, but, in times of 
emergency and with pressure from superiors exerted, these methods can by 
no means be classified as atrocities…. every effort should be made to prevent 
a trial of these men on the present basis, not so much because a miscarriage 
of justice should be prevented, but because the interests of this agency and 
perhaps to a great extent the entire United States occupation forces could be 
protected…. As indicated by a number of events, the KPD had learned of 
Fischer’s usage by Region IV and by this Headquarters some time ago. The 
possibility exists that a plan was arranged then, whereby perhaps two flies 
could be killed with one stroke, the elimination of Fischer and the discovery 
of the amount of penetration effected by him within the KPD.57
The response by CIC headquarters is not located in CIC files on Fischer 
or Mahler, but a later comment by Col. David Erskine, the CIC 66th 
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Detachment’s commanding officer, suggests that senior CIC officers took a 
different tack. As Erskine explained later to his superiors at OMGUS, 
The [Fischer] net was … neutralized and eventually disbanded when 
it became unwieldy and began to exhibit a lack of requisite security. 
Meanwhile, Fischer became a definite security problem for this organization. 
It was felt that he would require an extensive ‘debriefing’ period before he 
could be safely dropped by this organization. The debriefing process was 
well underway at the time the Subject was brought to trial and convicted. 
The conviction, in actuality, gave this organization a ‘stated’ reason to more 
speedily terminate its relationship with Subject.58 
In short, the CIC did not protect Fischer and Mahler. It allowed the trial to go 
forward as a way to neutralize Fischer, perhaps in the expectation that neither 
man would reveal his sources to the German authorities.
Fischer and Mahler stood trial in Bavarian State Court in Munich from 
December 19–22, 1949, for their excesses during their Gestapo service. Mahler’s 
service in Einsatzgruppe B never came up in this trial. There were originally 14 
complaints against Fischer and 12 against Mahler, most centering on beatings 
of Communists during interrogations. For many of the accusers, the trial was 
political from the start. “Now we’ll at least have two of this gang,” said one 
witness.59 Several witnesses out of more than 40 that were called tempered their 
testimonies once warned of the penalty for perjury. Other witness statements 
were based on hearsay. Yet Fischer was still found guilty of beating prisoners and 
forcing confessions in six cases (two confessions led to executions). Mahler was 
found guilty of three beatings and one confession forced through threats.  
Their sentences were relatively mild. Both Gestapo functionaries broke German 
laws governing police interrogations that were still technically valid under the Nazis. 
But the court gave allowance for the fact that Fischer and Mahler, as police officers, 
were trying to uncover cases of high treason in wartime. Fischer received a five-year 
prison sentence and Mahler a sentence of four years, but each sentence was reduced 
by 18 months, owing to time already served in Allied enclosures.60 
The CIC was philosophical. Though some evidence was unreliable and 
perhaps even perjured, there was also little doubt that the defendants “did strike 
and mistreat some prisoners.” “Considering the pressure on the judge [and] the 
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unruly mob of KPD people in the courtroom,” noted Special Agent Siegfried 
Clemens, the verdicts were as favorable to the former Gestapo officers as could 
be expected.61 And Fischer revealed no CIC sources during the trial. “Whether 
the results of the trial will affect the prestige of CIC in the Munich-Augsburg 
area remains to be seen,” reported Maj. George Riggin, “but it is doubted at the 
present time…. [To] date there have been no indications that any KPD sources 
have been or will be compromised. It is not anticipated that Fischer will reveal 
any sources known to him.” In February 1950 the CIC officially dropped him.62
Both men fled Munich before the sentencing session and lived in hiding 
thereafter.63 West German state authorities asked the U.S. High Commission 
under John McCloy to locate them. Erskine from the 66th Detachment 
Headquarters noted as late as October 1950 that he had no objection. Fischer 
had been dropped. Yet Erskine also noted in October that the CIC had “no 
information concerning the present whereabouts of these two men.”64 Skeptical 
West German police authorities placed the CIC Region IV Headquarters in 
Augsburg under surveillance on the assumption that both men were secretly 
employed there.65
While a sampling of relevant files does not establish Fischer’s whereabouts, 
it also reveals that Mahler went back to work for the CIC just days after his 
disappearance. A handwritten directive from Special Agent Eugene Kolb, who 
was then still handling Barbie, warned other agents “to be extremely careful with 
F 9 M [Mahler]. Contacts should if possible either be discontinued or made 
outside of Augsburg ... any indication of police surveillance is to be brought to 
my attention immediately.”66 
In July 1950, Special Agent Herbert Bechtold reported that, in keeping with 
the June 7, 1949, directive from Browning, “former Gestapo agents of primary 
importance are now being re-contacted for a total exploitation of all phases of 
their experience not previously covered in the more cursory interrogation. This 
phase of the investigation pertains primarily to leads and cases once handled 
by these agents….” In Mahler’s case, this involved his 1943 investigation of the 
White Rose. To Mahler, it was an unfinished case because, even though the White 
Rose leaders were arrested, tried, and in some cases executed, there were loose 
ends. The White Rose case also gave Mahler an additional chance to re-establish 
his anti-communist bona fides with the United States.
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Mahler’s July 14, 1950, report on “Sedition Activities of the Scholl Twins” is 
of interest to scholars of the White Rose insofar as the 17-page report includes 
Gestapo efforts to stop the distribution of anti-Hitler leaflets before the arrest of 
Hans and Sophie Scholl in February 1943. But it also paints Hans Scholl, whom 
Mahler interrogated, as a Communist. Scholl came, Mahler said, from a “Marxistic 
(sic) oriented family, which nevertheless spread a cloak of religious piety over its 
existence.” White Rose leaflets, in Mahler’s retelling, “were atheistic and cultural 
Bolshevistic propaganda….” Under interrogation, Hans Scholl argued “that 
communism had been a decided improvement over the Czarist dynasty” and that 
“an alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany could only be advantageous to 
both nations.” Mahler further emphasized that White Rose member Falk Harnack 
was the brother of Arvid Harnack, a leader in the Soviet spy ring in Germany known 
as the Red Orchestra, and that the Gestapo had never been able to investigate the 
possible connections between the two organizations. In reality, there was nothing 
communistic about any of the White Rose leaflets. But the connection impressed 
Special Agent Bechtold. He recommended “more active exploitation” of Mahler.  
While in hiding, Mahler had his attorney appeal his criminal conviction. The 
Superior State Court in Munich rejected Mahler’s appeal on December 21, 1951. 
Mahler immediately worried for his safety. He tried to blackmail Max Lappler, a KPD 
member, with exposure as a CIC informant if Lappler did not produce the “order” 
by the East German Communist Party (SED) that Mahler thought prompted the 
West German KPD to use criminal trials to neutralize former Gestapo figures. Such, 
Mahler thought, would negate his conviction.67 He also asked West Germany’s neo-
Nazi party (the Socialist Reich Party) to help him escape Germany for Argentina 
and to provide him with financial assistance. He cited his loyalty to the Nazi party as 
making him worthy of its aid.68 The Mahler file ends with this request. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
The CIC and Right-Wing Shadow Politics
Allied intelligence organizations monitored communist parties in postwar 
Germany and Austria, but they also worried about Nazi resurgence. Many 
former Wehrmacht and SS officers were involved in political intrigue after the 
war.1 Scholarly accounts of such movements exist, but the new CIC records 
have hundreds of files on such groups. What follows are two examples––the 
Bruderschaft (Brotherhood), a shadow organization in West Germany, and the 
Spinne (Spider) a shadow organization in Austria. 
The Bruderschaft
The Bruderschaft (Brotherhood) was a semi-secret postwar organization of 
perhaps 2,500 right-wing German nationalists. The outlines of the organization 
are known. It was formed in 1949 in the British occupation zone amongst staff 
officers from the army’s elite Grossdeutschland Division, former SS officers, 
and senior Nazi party members who had been held in England after the war. 
It worked behind the scenes of West German politics. It maintained ties with 
right-wing parties and groups in West Germany and with neo-Fascists and ex-
Nazis abroad, advocating a Europe independent of either the United States or 
the USSR, and disintegrated owing to internal fights in 1951. Its significance lay 
within the rearmament debate in West Germany in 1950 and 1951. 
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The Bruderschaft’s effect was marginal, but the threat it represented 
for Atlantic security earned it close surveillance by the U.S. Army 
Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), which discovered the organization after its 
first meeting in Hamburg in July 1949. The CIC quickly developed sources 
within the organization. Some 1,500 to 2,000 new pages on the Bruderschaft 
have now been released. CIC surveillance revealed how badly compromised 
some of its leaders were, while revealing a fuller picture of the organization’s 
overall strategy and personality feuds. 
The Bruderschaft had two leaders. One was SS Col. Alfred Franke-Gricksch. 
He joined the Nazi Party in 1926 and the SS in 1935. He served as an intelligence 
officer in the SS Death’s Head Division in 1939 and in 1943 moved to the Reich 
Security Main Office (RSHA) Personnel Office (Amt I) first as Personal Adjutant 
to Maximilian von Herff and then as the head of the office. In 1943 Franke-
Gricksch traveled through occupied Poland, visiting the camps of Auschwitz 
and Maidanek and witnessing the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. 
He marveled at the wealth collected from Jewish ghettos as well as Auschwitz’s 
efficiency in disposing of Jews.2 Even in April 1945 he remained a true believer 
calling for a renewal of Nazi concepts, this time by a group of elite leaders rather 
than a single man.3 He was in British captivity from 1945 to 1948, during which 
time he provided information for MI6.4 He then returned to his castle near 
Bielefeld and worked to implement his vision through the political system. 
The other leader was Maj. Helmut Beck-Broichsitter, an ex-staff officer from 
the Grossdeutschland division, who had a reputation as “one of the best qualified 
young General Staff [sic] Officers in the German Army.”5 Beck-Broichsitter 
joined the Army in August 1939, serving in Poland, France, Greece, and the 
USSR. But he joined the Nazi Party in 1931, was a member of the SA in 1932, 
and a member of the police until 1939. As an Army officer from 1939 to 1944, 
he served in a variety of field gendarme units, which helped to combat partisans 
behind German lines. This placed him in the category of automatic arrest.6 
Other leaders in the Bruderschaft were more notorious. Karl Kaufmann was 
one of the Nazi Party’s earliest members (1922). He was the party Gauleiter in 
Hamburg from 1929 to 1945 and Hamburg’s governor (Reichsstatthalter) from 
1933 to 1945. From a stolen Jewish villa, he ran one of Germany’s most corrupt 
administrations, wherein Jewish property and capital rewarded supporters. In 
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September 1941 Kaufmann became the first city official to deport Jews to occupied 
Poland. He protected himself after the war with the myth that he opposed the 
Gestapo, that he lived a modest life on a modest salary, and that he tried to 
minimize anti-Jewish measures in Hamburg. The British arrested him in May 
1945, but Kaufmann was released for health reasons in October 1948. By 1950 CIC 
knew him as a “bad type” who “controls a group of former NSDAP members.”7 
A January 1950 story in the New York Herald Tribune alerted the public to the 
Bruderschaft. It painted the Bruderschaft as a shadow general staff that provided 
advice to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer through Gen. Hasso von 
Manteuffel, the Grossdeutschland Division’s commander for much of 1944 and 
one of Adenauer’s informal advisers on rearmament. Could the Bruderschaft 
have signaled that a reconstituted Wehrmacht might overturn the new German 
democracy?8 Though Manteuffel publicly denied Bruderschaft membership 
(many sources said he was a member), the press in both Germanys registered 
concerns. U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy responded that Allied agents 
were studying the group. 9 
The CIC began investigating the Bruderschaft in July 1949 with mail intercepts 
after learning of a secret meeting in Hamburg. The British shared intelligence from 
their zone. They cryptically revealed that Franke-Gricksch was a “high-category 
Nazi who was released under certain restrictions” but “failed to live up to the 
conditions of his release.”10 The CIC recruited its own more moderate sources 
from within the Bruderschaft. These included Col. Eberhard Graf von Nostitz, 
a former staff officer from the 2nd Panzer Army and close friend of Manteuffel. 
He worked for British intelligence, with a net that included former Foreign Office 
and Gestapo personnel, and also worked for the Gehlen Organization. Though he, 
like Manteuffel, denied membership in the Bruderschaft, he maintained frequent 
contact with its members and attended its meetings.11
Centered in Hamburg, the Bruderschaft was strongest in the British zone, 
but it also had members in the French, U.S., and Soviet zones.  Its overt aims 
were easy to learn, since Beck-Broichsitter spoke with Allied authorities and the 
press. These aims reflected well-worn army officers’ thinking: anti-Soviet and 
pro-Western policies that also called for the rehabilitation of German soldiers 
through restored state pensions and the release of officers from war crimes 
enclosures. Beck-Broichsitter told U.S. High Commission members that the 
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Soviets aimed at “the Bolshevization of Western Germany and Western Europe 
through phony peace initiatives and the offer of German unity.” The United 
States, he said, should counter Soviet efforts. “It had been Germany’s historic 
mission during the past 1,000 years,” he said “to defend the Occident against 
Russian onslaughts.”12 Beck-Broichsitter further noted that the officer class “feel 
that their honor has been insulted by the mass arrests and other indignities they 
have endured as an aftermath of World War II.”13 
The Bruderschaft’s covert aims were more dangerous. A CIA assessment of 
August 1950 noted “the implications of the covert program, together with the 
political backgrounds of the leaders and most of the members, leave little doubt 
that the organization espouses neo-Nazism, with changes from the Nazi program 
dictated by an opportunistic appraisal of the present international situation.”14 
The Bruderschaft insisted that the Federal Republic and its constitution were 
illegitimate Allied-imposed structures. Karl Dönitz, Hitler’s successor who 
surrendered militarily to the Allies in May 1945 and was now serving a prison 
sentence, never surrendered state power. “Under these circumstances,” read a 
secret Bruderschaft statement of February 1950, “the [former] German state 
must be considered as still in existence.” The Bruderschaft favored dictatorship 
by elite officers: “We hope,” said the statement, “that the era of the masses has 
passed, and that the moment for the development of the elite has come.”15 
The Bruderschaft aimed to create such a condition by forging right-wing party 
coalitions, placing its members in key government positions, and exercising influence 
behind the scenes. Intercepted correspondence from 1949 revealed that Beck-
Broichsitter tried to forge a CDU-Deutsche Partei coalition in Schleswig-Holstein 
to maximize the right-wing vote there.16 In November 1950 Beck-Broichsitter 
talked of a “National Representation” of right-wing parties, including the neo-Nazi 
Socialist Reich Party (SRP) which “would form a state within a state and would be 
independent of both the Bonn Government and the Government of East Germany.” 
British sources said that former Gen. Heinz Guderian, the famous tank commander 
who served as Hitler’s loyal army chief-of-staff in 1944 and 1945, agreed to lead 
the National Representation.17 Franke-Gricksch said privately that parliamentary 
government in West Germany would collapse by 1953 and that there were “sufficient 
qualified men within the Bruderschaft’s ranks to take over the entire administration 
of Germany.”18 The CIA noted “several instances of lower-level relationships between 
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the Bruderschaft and regional officials of the federal coalition parties….”19 There was 
no evidence that the Bruderschaft influenced government policy but some members, 
including Manteuffel, had access to senior figures.20
 The Bruderschaft’s covert foreign aims included an armed independent 
European force under German leadership, as anti-American as it was anti-
Soviet. It thus rejected German membership in NATO. As special agent 
Edward Hoffer noted, the Bruderschaft was “not pro-Allied. They are simply 
pro-Deutsch, and against any form of east or west occupation or protection.” 
They even rejected the Gehlen Organization’s work under ostensible U.S. 
supervision.21 Guderian said in August 1950 that he would “rather raise the 
pistol to both the Americans and the Russians at the same time,” but for the 
impracticality of such a step.22 “The covert program,” according to the CIA, 
projects a united Europe in which Germany would presumably play 
the leading role by virtue of its size, power, and position. This Europe 
would withdraw from close political and military cooperation with 
the US and, although opposing international Bolshevism and Soviet 
interference in European affairs, could take a neutral position between 
the US and USSR or even enter as an equal partner into alliance with the 
USSR. The authoritarian government envisioned for Germany, despite 
Bruderschaft claims that it is against Fascism and dictatorship, would 
presumably be extended to the other European countries through the 
foreign neo-fascists with whom the Bruderschaft maintains contact.23
Finally, the Bruderschaft insisted on restoration of Germany’s 1937 
boundaries, which its members believed could be attained with timely lies to the 
Soviets and Americans alike. The Poles, who had benefited most from border 
readjustments in 1945, would not be consulted.24
How were the covert aims to be brought about? The Bruderschaft maintained 
close ties with like-minded Germans from former Nazis to Ruhr industrialists 
as well as right-wing groups throughout Western Europe. Franke-Gricksch was 
in frequent touch with British Fascist Oswald Mosley, and Beck-Broichsitter 
claimed to have met Pope Pius XII. “The Catholic Church is very interested in 
our movement,” Beck-Broichsitter said, “because we represent the first line of 
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defense against Bolshevism.”25 Franke-Gricksch also cultivated contacts in the 
East Germany. These included secret Bruderschaft members with whom Franke-
Gricksch maintained courier nets. They also included members of the Socialist 
Unity Party and the Soviet Military Administration. Franke-Gricksch hoped that 
Moscow’s various statements on German unity in return for “peace”––whatever 
this might mean to the Soviets––might be used to good effect.26 
In August 1950 Karl Kaufmann talked of “primarily siding with the Russians, 
and later turning against them in order to reestablish the old Germany.”27 In March 
1951, Franke-Gricksch argued that “Germany should pretend to collaborate with 
the East until certain concessions are granted by the West, then shift toward 
the West to gain concessions from the East.”28 In November 1950, he told the 
Americans through Günther d’Alquen (the former editor of the SS magazine Das 
Schwarze Korps) that “the Americans sooner or later will be compelled to turn to 
the Bruderschaft for assistance….”29 In fact, Franke-Gricksch’s relationships in East 
Germany opened the Bruderschaft up to penetration by communist agents.30 
What could be done about the Bruderschaft? Adenauer’s top military advisers, 
Gen. Adolf Heusinger and Gen. Hans Speidel, viewed the Bruderschaft as “young, 
overambitious, ex-officers” who comprised a “radical right wing group” with a 
“liberal sprinkling of SS elements” who “became bitter over their fate after the 
war and decided that their life under Hitler wasn’t so bad after all.” According to 
the British, Manteuffel and other senior army officers in the Bruderschaft were 
mostly interested in restoring the Wehrmacht’s good name and were “horrified 
by the public exposure of their names as leaders of an underground movement 
in association with those of ex-Gauleiters and SS leaders.” Equally uncomfortable 
with Franke-Gricksch’s Communist ties, they hoped to reorganize the Bruderschaft 
along more conservative lines in 1950. Heusinger and Speidel argued that state 
pensions for officers and the release of Army personnel from war crimes enclosures 
would satisfy ex-officers and help the Bruderschaft to “die a natural death.”31 
In fact, the Bruderschaft died even before such developments owing to splits 
between Franke-Gricksch and Beck-Broichsitter. Disagreements over strategy 
were decisive. By 1951 Beck-Broichsitter and the military clique, though still 
hoping for military independence, advocated cooperation with the United States 
and rejected connections with the USSR. Franke-Griksch’s backers believed a 
pro-Soviet policy offered the best chance for German unity and that “One cannot 
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trust the words of [NATO Commander] Eisenhower since he remains what he 
has always been, namely a German hater.”32 In a bitter meeting of February 1951 
Franke-Gricksch accused Beck-Broichsitter of spying on the Bruderschaft for the 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), West Germany’s domestic intelligence 
agency. Beck-Broichsitter resigned from his leadership post rather than undergo 
a trial by the Bruderschaft’s honor court. The CIC later established that he had 
a relationship with the BfV, which was surely interested in Franke-Gricksch’s 
connections with East Germany and the Soviets.33
After his ouster in February 1951, Beck-Broichsitter took the Bruderschaft 
factions from the French occupation zone and from Baden-Württemberg in the 
U.S. zone, and renamed his group the Bruderschaft Deutschland. Ostensibly he 
rejected cooperation with former Nazi figures, but in July 1951 he appointed Erich 
Bujalla, a former Gestapo officer from Bremen, as his local designate in Frankfurt. 
Bujalla pledged to “use a definite National Socialist spirit in leading the Frankfurt 
Bruderschaft.” He quickly recruited old Nazi police friends for the Bruderschaft 
Deutschland.34 For the rest, Beck-Broichsitter maintained contact with Hans Speidel 
during the rearmament debates, advocating a paramilitary program for German 
boys under the Bruderschaft Deutschland that included marching, reconnaissance, 
and the like. He increasingly became a non-factor as West Germany remilitarized, 
joined NATO, and saw its ex-Wehrmacht officers released from Allied prisons.35 
Franke-Gricksch continued to build the Bruderschaft. But in October 1951, during 
a trip to East Germany, he was arrested and tried for war crimes in the USSR. He 
reportedly died in a Soviet prison camp in 1953.36 
The Spider
Previously released CIC materials contained spotty information on Austria thanks 
partly to the scattered and fragmentary nature of the operational records of the 
430th CIC Detachment, which monitored the U.S. occupation zone there.37 The 
most interesting material thus far has been the lengthy personal file of Wilhelm 
Höttl, a SD officer who served in Hungary in 1944 and who created two intelligence 
nets for the CIC in 1948.38 The new records contain more information on such 
activity. The tale of an organization called the Spinne (Spider) serves as an example.
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The Spinne is the stuff of legend. It was “uncovered” in 1949 by the American 
journalist Curt Reiss who wrote that Goebbels’s subordinate Dr. Johannes Leers stood 
at its head. In the 1960s it was said to be a secret organization of former Nazis with 
high contacts in West Germany that helped war criminals escape to the Middle East, 
South Africa, and elsewhere.39 The true Spinne was actually a secret association of 
Austrian Nazis who in 1949 pressed for the rehabilitation of Austrian Nazis and for a 
pan-German agenda that included a second Anschluss with a reunited Germany. Its 
significance lies in the Austrian national election of October 1949. 
Austria had roughly 700,000 Nazis when the war ended. In May 1945 Austria’s 
new government legally banned the Nazi organizations, prohibited former Nazis 
from voting and state employment, and required all Nazis to register (about 524,000 
did so). A War Criminals Law of June 1945 established People’s Courts throughout 
Austria that heard some 136,000 cases and pronounced 13,607 guilty verdicts 
over the next decade.40 The National Socialist Law of February 1947 established 
categories of Nazis including war criminals (including illegal Nazis from the 1933 
to 1938 period); “incriminated” Nazis (SS and Gestapo members for instance); 
and “less-incriminated” Nazis. A law of April 1948 amnestied “less-incriminated” 
Nazis (about 550,000 persons), allowing them to vote. With only 2.5 million voters 
in Austria, this group and their families were an important voting bloc. 41 
The four occupying powers initially licensed three political parties in 
Austria. The Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei––ÖVP) 
represented Catholic conservatives. The Social Democratic Party of Austria 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs––SPÖ) and the Communist Party 
of Austria (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs––KPÖ) represented the 
moderate and extreme left. The ÖVP and SPÖ formed an anti-Communist 
coalition government in 1945. But was a coalition between conservatives and 
social democrats the only anti-Communist alternative? Might a more rightist 
alternative be attractive to former Nazis in 1949?
Herbert Kraus was the main figure vying for the votes of former Nazis. 
Born in Zagreb in 1911, Kraus was a German economic official in the Ukraine 
from 1941 to 1943 who was removed for speaking against German policies. He 
then served in a combat intelligence unit. He emerged after the war in Salzburg 
where he lived in the renovated Schloss Frohnberg (later made famous in The 
Sound of Music). 
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Kraus formed a private think tank in Salzburg called the Österreichische 
Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaft und Politik, which conducted public opinion 
polls and reported news and opinion in a weekly called Berichte und Informationen. 
He also had a relationship with CIC, having turned over various SS personalities to 
U.S. authorities after the war and having helped create four intelligence operations 
including Project Jackpot, aimed at the KPÖ. Berichte and Informationen was 
highly critical of the Soviets but also complained about the “punitive” nature of 
denazification in Austria, which prevented a more “spiritual denazification” and 
the joining of Austria with the western bloc of nations. The CIC viewed Kraus as 
reliable and pro-American, with “mild rightist tendencies.”42 The CIC’s operations 
chief in Salzburg, Maj. James V. Milano, noted in 1948 that up to one-third of the 
Army’s intelligence efforts in Austria depended on Krause.43 In fact, his research 
institute might have had an intelligence-gathering function.44
In February 1949 Kraus formed a fourth political party called the League of 
Independents (Verband der Unabhänginge––VdU). It was a non-religious party 
committed to free markets that aimed to attract the uncommitted 30 percent 
of the Austrian electorate, including “intellectual Nazis,” right-wing Socialists, 
and conservative independents, all of which, he felt, could produce 1.5 million 
votes.45 Kraus hoped he could form a right-wing coalition with the ÖVP. The 
Spinne was an organization of former war criminals and other “implicated” 
Nazis. They could neither vote nor serve in state office, and they faced possible 
criminal charges. They aimed to take over the VdU from within and govern from 
behind the scenes afterwards. Austrian historian Lothar Höbelt dismisses the 
Spinne entirely in his apologetic history of the VdU.46  
The CIC first learned of the Spinne in September 1949 after the ÖVP began 
an anti-VdU press campaign aimed at maintaining ÖVP vote totals.47 In an 
extensive investigation CIC special agents interviewed VdU functionaries who 
had resigned from the party, intercepted and transcribed telephone calls to and 
from VdU leaders, and studied key VdU documents. One of the informants was 
Karl von Winkler, a former Abwehr major who had worked against the Nazis in 
Austria and who was a founding member of the VdU, hoping that it might become 
a legitimate nationalist party.48 Another was Hans Georg von Schwarzkopf, 
Kraus’s private secretary, who was a reliable U.S. informant, providing extensive 
information on Kraus, the VdU, and its Nazi supporters.49 
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The Spinne initially formed in U.S. Detention Camp Marcus W. Orr in 
Glanzenbach near Salzburg. This camp held more Nazi officials than any other 
enclosure in Austria, some 12,000 in all.50 It was a hothouse of unreconstructed 
Nazism and political intrigue. The CIC had an agent within the camp and a number 
of informants including von Schwarzkopf. “The inmates of Camp Orr,” reported 
CIC Special Agent F. K. Richter, “regarded themselves as the elite of Austria, and 
they were firmly convinced that Austrian recovery depended entirely upon their 
release…. They felt absolutely certain that they would regain their power, staff the 
government with experts rather than ‘politicians,’ and establish a new and better 
National Socialist regime [,] naturally avoiding the errors made by Hitler and 
his ‘false advisors.’”51 Members of the Spinne organization, according to various 
informants, swore “an oath of loyalty and solidarity” and were “devoted to the re-
establishment of their personal power.” The name Spinne referred to “a centrally 
located body… and a web, reaching to all National Socialists and into all Allied 
Intelligence Services.”52 Camp Orr officially closed in August 1948.
The leaders of the Spinne were Erich Kernmayer and Karl Kowarik, both 
implicated Austrian Nazis. Kernmayer joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1934, 
when both were illegal in Austria. After the Anschluss in 1938 he became the 
editor of the formerly anti-Nazi periodical Deutsche Telegraf. From 1939 to 1940 
he was the press chief for Gauleiter Joseph Bürckel of Vienna, during a period of 
intense anti-Jewish violence, expropriation, and expulsion there. When Bürckel 
became Gauleiter in the Westmark (the Saar, Bavarian Palatinate, and Lorraine), 
Kernmayer again became his press chief. In 1941 during Germany’s invasion 
of Greece, Kernmayer was assigned to the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler as a war 
propagandist. Later service took him to the USSR, to Hungary, and ultimately in 
1945, to American captivity.53 In Camp Orr, Kernmayer broadcast news analysis 
over the public address system. His anti-Soviet comments predicted imminent war 
between the United States and the USSR. A CIC agent in the camp, Special Agent 
F. K. Richter, suspected that Kernmayer was behind the murder of Professor Alois 
Koch in March 1947 for Koch’s collaboration with the Americans.54
Karl Kowarik was another Vienna Nazi who joined the Party in 1930. He 
became the Hitler Youth leader in Vienna in 1934 and eventually all of Austria. 
Described as “an old National Socialist of outstanding conviction,” he became an 
SS officer in 1939.55 According to one CIC agent, Kowarik was one of Camp Orr’s 
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most violent Nazis, “a man who would have been nothing save for the Nazis, and 
who could never be expected to give up his National Socialist convictions.”56 
Kernmayer and Kowarik were released from Camp Orr in 1947. They found 
work as operations chiefs in the CIC intelligence nets created by Wilhelm Höttl 
in 1948. The CIC dropped both nets in 1949 owing to their unreliability. But 
Kernmayer continued to find work as a U.S. intelligence source while also writing 
an anti-Semitic apologia for Nazism published in Switzerland entitled Die grosse 
Rausch (The Great Intoxication,  1948), which sold 12,000 copies in Austria within 
three months (the Allies later banned sales of the book in Austria).57 It was the first 
of a number of books in which Kernmayer glorified the Nazi past. CIC agents in 
Salzburg protected Kernmayer. In 1948 Austrian authorities arrested him for trial 
in Linz. CIC officials “advised the Austrian judicial authorities to take no further 
action in the pending case until further advised by the American authorities,” then 
asked them to halt prosecution altogether. As late as January 1949, Kernmayer was 
still connected with a CIC network, and as late as 1952, the CIC reported that 
he was “selling spurious intelligence reports to intelligence agencies in Austria” 
regarding Soviet activities.58 
Kernmayer and Kowarik supported themselves through peddling 
intelligence. But they wanted political power, and Kraus’s VdU was the perfect 
vehicle. Kernmayer might have known Kraus from his time in Camp Orr. 
His broadcasts were culled from Kraus’s Berichte und Informationen. In 1948 
Kernmayer approached Kraus, introducing him to Camp Orr’s leading Nazis 
who were looking for a “political mouthpiece.” According to Kraus’s secretary 
Hans Georg Schwartzkopf, “the Nazis fed Dr. Kraus’ ambition and vanity” and 
the “entire organization of the VdU was submitted to Dr. Kraus by these Nazis.”59 
Another source noted that, “from the very beginning [Kernmayer] told Dr. 
Herbert A. Kraus that he [Kernmayer] was the man who could lead the great 
mass of the former Nazis into the VdU.”60 
When he announced his plans to form the VdU in February 1949, Kraus, 
according to CIC sources, stated that he “intended to recruit the million votes 
now controlled by former Nazis and their families.”61 Such would give him 40 
percent of the vote. “The Nazis will not run my Party,” Kraus told former German 
intelligence official Hans Gostentschnigg, “we need them only to increase our 
votes and our membership.”62 “He stated to me,” said Hans Georg Schwarzkopf, 
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“that the VdU could not exist without the Nazis and that he had to be careful not 
to let the Nazis deprive him of his own power at some later time.”63
How did Kraus plan to control the Nazis within his party? The CIC learned 
that Kraus  “proposed to use alleged non-implicated Nazis who enjoy the fullest 
confidence of the former National Socialists to secure this voting block [sic].”64 But 
the implicated Nazis had different plans. The initial general meeting of the VdU on 
March 26, 1949, included implicated Nazis, and according to Schwarzkopf, it took 
place in an atmosphere reminiscent of “old-time Nazi gatherings. The old National 
Socialists present were determined to gain the upper hand.” A few non-Nazis, such 
as Kraus himself, occupied senior positions, but it was “only the agreement of the 
Nazis which [allowed Kraus] to maintain his position as chairman of the VdU.” U.S. 
authorities reported that “While the VdU is ostensibly a democratic and non-Nazi 
party operating under the slogan of ‘decency’ (Anstaendigkeit), and was probably 
originally intended as such by its founder, Dr. Kraus, it could not maintain such a 
direction for very long, because of the National Socialist advisors with whom Dr. 
Kraus surrounded himself. Dr. Kraus is considered to be a very pliable man….”65    
Kernmayer placed Spinne members in the VdU’s national administration and, 
according to the Austrian authorities, they constantly reported back to him.66 His 
network included Franz Pesendorfer who belonged to the SS Standarte 89 in Vienna, 
responsible for the 1934 murder of Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss. Pesendorfer led 
the VdU’s press office.67 Felix Rinner, another former member of SS Standarte 89, 
told a CIC informant in 1949 that “I work for the VdU in Vienna because it is ‘our’ 
party… I am not a member of the VdU but I devote all of my time to informing 
our people that they must vote only for the VdU. We are a completely right-wing 
party and we hope to constitute a two-third majority in Austria, together with the 
ÖVP.”68 Numerous sources placed Höttl within the Spinne as the VdU’s intelligence 
chief. As Austrian police authorities told the Americans, “Kernmayer and Kowarik 
hope that they can get rid of Dr. Kraus without any difficulties; they are waiting 
only for the moment in which the Nazis, through the VdU, will get … a voice in 
parliament, in order to show their demands and carry them out.”69 Already on 
September 20, telephone intercepts revealed calls to Kraus with warnings such as 
“we do not agree with your program, change it.” Special Agent Roger E. Lankford 
concluded that, “the ‘Spider Group’ is a group of ex-high Nazis who are hopeful 
of regaining political power in the future; that they are actually the ‘power behind 
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the thrown [sic]’ as far as the VdU is concerned; that they are actually giving Kraus 
… all orders.”70
What was the VdU agenda? According to Schwarzkopf, “Dr. Kraus and his VdU 
are completely pan-German in their orientation.” They favored a united Germany 
joined with Austria. Kraus had frequent meetings with members of the Deutsche 
Union in Germany, particularly former Wehrmacht officers, who, according to 
Schwarzkopf, “look upon the founding of the VdU as a trial run for a similar 
movement in Germany.” Kraus, meanwhile, was sure that the VdU would gain at 
least 30 percent of the vote and that even ÖVP and SPÖ functionaries would defect 
to the VdU shortly before the election. The victory, he said, would be “of landslide 
proportions.” VdU intelligence officers including Höttl were “almost exclusively 
Nazis,” who followed the tactics to undermine the Austrian government that had 
proven successful in 1938.71 Karl von Winkler told CIC investigators that “…the 
VdU, as it stands today and has always stood, is pan-German and antisemitic in 
intent … Dr. Kraus is completely swayed by his Nazi advisors.”72
As the October 1949 elections drew closer, others showed increased concern. 
Andreas Rohrbacher, the Archbishop of Salzburg, with whom Kraus had been 
friendly, now admonished Kraus. “Your party,” said the Archbishop, “will materially 
weaken the conservative front and thus increase the power of the leftist parties…. I 
have misgivings about some points of your program, which sound rather radical, 
and then also because of the incorrigible Nazis … you are providing cover for a 
group of people now who, sooner or later, will show their real face….”73 
The ÖVP launched a press campaign against the VdU hinting that Kraus 
was a CIC agent and that his party was a front for a Nazi resurgence. The CIC 
worried that Kraus and other intelligence contacts would be compromised. “Such 
a campaign,” wrote Major Milano, “can be a serious blow to US intelligence as well 
as result in the loss of a large financial investment. Dr. Krause [sic] is definitely a 
long-range proposition.” Milano also worried that Krause could retaliate against 
the ÖVP’s own intelligence connections that had a Nazi taint. The entire feud 
could have major repercussions, which, according to Maj. J. V. Milano, could “kill 
one third of the USFA [what is this organization?] intelligence effort….”74  
Instead, the CIC managed its own campaign. Dr. Gustav Canaval was the 
conservative editor of the Salzburger Nachrichten, the first licensed newspaper 
in the U.S. zone of Austria. He had been a friend of Kurt von Schusschnigg, 
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the Austrian Chancellor ousted by Hitler, and he was the editor of the Deutsche 
Telegraf in 1938 when Kernmayer took it over. He thus had a score to settle.75 
Canaval launched an anti-VdU press campaign, partially funded by the Austrian 
government. Canaval even coordinated with the World Jewish Congress (WJC), 
and, with the help of U.S. contacts, he published translated versions of WJC 
articles sent to French, Swiss, and U.S. news agencies about the VdU. The CIC 
kept its role invisible to avoid compromising its relationship with anyone who 
might be “possible future sources of information.”76  
In the October 1949 national election, the VdU gained only 11.7 percent of 
the national vote and 16 parliamentary seats out of 165. The SPÖ remained the 
ÖVP’s coalition partners. The VdU’s share of the vote was the strongest showing 
by an alternative right-wing party until Jörg Haider’s victory of 1990, but the 
party fell into dissension in 1952. It disintegrated by 1955. Kernmayer continued 
his dubious writing career under the pseudonym Erich Kern, maintained contacts 
with old SS colleagues, and continued to sell “spurious intelligence reports” on 
the Soviets to various agencies in Austria.77 Kraus resigned as VdU chairman in 
1952. In the meantime he continued to work as an anti-Communist agitator and 
established liaisons with French and German right-wing groups interested in 
European unity. Included among his contacts in 1950 were leading members of 
the Bruderschaft in Germany.78 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Collaborators: Allied Intelligence and the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Newly released Army and CIA records have many thousands of pages on Nazi 
collaborators during and after World War II. The records are especially rich con-
cerning Allied relationships with Ukrainian nationalist organizations after 1945. 
This section focuses on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Ste-
phen Bandera and the exile representation of the Ukrainian underground gov-
ernment (ZP/UHVR), which was dominated by Bandera’s one-time followers-
turned-rivals, including Mykola Lebed. The level of detail in the new records al-
lows a fuller and more accurate picture of their relationships with Allied intelli-
gence over several decades.1 
Background
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929 by western Ukrai-
nians from East Galicia, called for an independent and ethnically homogenous Ukraine. 
Its prime enemy was Poland, which then controlled the ethnically mixed regions of East 
Galicia and Volhynia. The OUN assassinated Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki 
in 1934. Among those tried, convicted, and imprisoned for the murder in 1936 were 
young OUN activists Stephan Bandera and Mykola Lebed. The court sentenced them 
to death, and the state commuted the sentences to life imprisonment.2 The convicted 
Ukrainians escaped when the Germans invaded Poland in 1939.
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After the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 awarded Eastern Galicia and Volhynia to 
the USSR, the OUN turned its hopes toward the Germans. In late 1939 the Ger-
mans housed OUN leaders in Krakow, then the capital of the German-occupied 
General Government. In 1940 the OUN split over political strategy. The older wing 
under Andrei Melnik (OUN/M) aimed to work closely with the Germans while 
waiting patiently for Ukraine’s independence. Bandera’s wing (OUN/B) was a mil-
itant fascist organization that wanted Ukrainian independence immediately.
After the Germans invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941, Bandera’s teams 
moved into East Galicia. On reaching the East Galician capital city of Lwów on 
June 30, 1941, his closest deputy Jaroslav Stetsko proclaimed a “sovereign and unit-
ed” Ukrainian state in the name of Bandera and the OUN/B. Stetsko was to be the 
new prime minister and Lebed, having trained at a Gestapo center in Zakopane, 
the new minister for security.3
Determined to exploit Ukraine for themselves, the Germans insisted that Ban-
dera and Stetsko rescind this proclamation. When they refused, they, along with 
other OUN/B leaders, were arrested. Bandera and Stetsko were held initially in 
Berlin under house arrest. After January 1942 they were sent to Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp but in comparatively comfortable confinement. Adminis-
trative and senior auxiliary police positions in western Ukraine went to Melnik’s 
group.4 German security police formations, meanwhile, were ordered to arrest and 
kill Bandera loyalists in western Ukraine for fear that they would rise against Ger-
man rule.5
After Lebed escaped, he assumed control of the OUN/B in western Ukraine, 
which now operated underground. Eventually the OUN/B dominated the Ukrai-
nian Insurgent Army (UPA), a guerrilla force originally formed in 1942 to engage 
all political and ethnic enemies including Germans and Soviets. Eastern Ukraini-
ans later claimed that the Bandera’s group took over the UPA by assassinating the 
original leaders.6 By 1944 the terms “UPA” and “Baderovsty” became interchange-
able, though not all UPA fighters came from the OUN/B. The OUN/B relationship 
with the Germans in western Ukraine was complicated. On the one hand, it fought 
German rule, and the Gestapo put a price on Lebed’s head. On the other, it pur-
sued its own ethnic cleansing policies complementing German aims. 
A Banderist proclamation in April 1941 claimed that “Jews in the USSR 
constitute the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the 
Collaborators  |  75 
vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine.”7 Stetsko, even while under 
house arrest in July 1941, said that “I…fully appreciate the undeniably harm-
ful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine…. 
I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bring-
ing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine….”8 In Lwów, a leaf-
let warned Jews that, “You welcomed Stalin with flowers [when the Soviets 
occupied East Galicia in 1939]. We will lay your heads at Hitler’s feet.”9 At a 
July 6, 1941, meeting in Lwów, Bandera loyalists determined that Jews “have to 
be treated harshly…. We must finish them off…. Regarding the Jews, we will 
adopt any methods that lead to their destruction.”10 Indeed pogroms in East 
Galicia in the war’s first days killed perhaps 12,000 Jews.11 Back in Berlin, Stets-
ko reported it all to Bandera.12
Nazi authorities mobilized Ukrainians into auxiliary police units, some of 
which cleared ghettos. Few such auxiliary police belonged to Bandera’s group, 
which operated independently. But Banderist guerrillas in western Ukraine of-
ten killed Jews. Historian Yehuda Bauer writes that Banderists “killed all the Jews 
they could find,” surely “many thousands” in all.13 Moshe Maltz, a Jew living in 
hiding in Sokal, heard from a friendly Polish contact “about 40 Jews who were 
hiding out in the woods near his home …  the Bandera gangs came and mur-
dered them all.”14 
When the Soviets reconquered East Galicia in November 1944, there were 
few Jews there left alive. But Maltz recorded that, “When the Bandera gangs 
seize a Jew, they consider it a prize catch. The ordinary Ukrainians feel the same 
way…. they all want to participate in the heroic act of killing a Jew. They literally 
slash Jews to pieces with their machetes….”15
When the war turned against the Germans in early 1943, leaders of Bandera’s 
group believed that the Soviets and Germans would exhaust each other, leaving 
an independent Ukraine as in 1918. Lebed proposed in April to “cleanse the 
entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population,” so that a resurgent Polish 
state would not claim the region as in 1918.16 Ukrainians serving as auxiliary 
policemen for the Germans now joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). 
Maltz recorded that “Bandera men … are not discriminating about who they 
kill; they are gunning down the populations of entire villages.… Since there are 
hardly any Jews left to kill, the Bandera gangs have turned on the Poles. They are 
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literally hacking Poles to pieces. Every day … you can see the bodies of Poles, 
with wires around their necks, floating down the river Bug.”17 On a single day, 
July 11, 1943, the UPA attacked some 80 localities killing perhaps 10,000 Poles.18 
As the Red Army moved into western Ukraine (it liberated Lwów in July 
1944) the UPA resisted the Soviet advance with full-scale guerrilla war. Maltz 
noted that, “Most of the Bandera gangs, men and women, from the villages … 
are still hiding out in the woods, armed to the teeth, and hold up Soviet soldiers. 
The Soviets may be the rulers of the towns, but the Bandera gangs reign supreme 
in the surrounding countryside, especially at night. The Russians…have their 
hands full…. Hardly a day passes without a Soviet official being killed….”19 
The Banderists and UPA also resumed cooperation with the Germans. 
Though the SD was pleased with the intelligence received from the UPA on 
the Soviets, the Wehrmacht viewed Banderist terror against Polish civilians as 
counterproductive.20
In July 1944 nationalists in Ukraine formed the Supreme Ukrainian 
Liberation Council (UHVR), which served as an underground Ukrainian 
government in the Carpathian mountains. The UPA, now operating against 
the Soviets in smaller groups, was its army. The dominant political party in 
the UHVR was the Bandera group.21 In September 1944 the Germans released 
Bandera and Stetsko from Sachsenhausen. Berlin hoped to form a Ukrainian 
National Committee with both OUN factions and other Ukrainian leaders. 
The Committee was formed in November, but Bandera and Stetsko refused to 
cooperate. They escaped from Berlin in December and fled south, emerging after 
the war in Munich.22 
By 1947 some 250,000 Ukrainians were living as displaced persons in 
Germany, Austria, and Italy, many of them OUN activists or sympathizers.23 
After 1947 UPA fighters began crossing into the U.S. zone, having reached the 
border on foot through Czechoslovakia. They tended to be Banderist in their 
sympathies. We cannot describe here the background of most UPA men who 
reached the U.S. zone.24 But Mykola Ninowskyj’s story, which comes from 
a 1956 West German arrest report obtained by the CIA, may be typical. Born 
in 1920, Ninowskyj joined one of the Ukrainian battalions that advanced into 
East Galicia under German command in 1941. Later in the year he joined the 
201st Schutzmannschaft (Auxiliary Police) Battalion, which conducted what he 
Collaborators  |  77
described as “anti-partisan” operations in Belorussia. Under German direction, 
many of these battalions murdered Jews. In 1944 he returned to Galicia as a 
Banderist guerrilla fighter until 1948 when he made his way west as a courier. “I 
am on the Bandera side,” he told police in 1956.25
In the early postwar years Ukrainian DP camps were hotbeds of nationalist 
proselytizing. Bandera was determined to assert control over the émigré 
community. In February 1946 he formed the Foreign Section OUN (ZCh/
OUN), an exile branch of the Bandera group, in which he maintained “a firm 
line on all questions, political education, ideological and political unity, and 
discipline of the membership.”26 Bandera intended to create a dictatorship in 
exile, which he would then transfer to a liberated Ukraine. According to U.S. 
Army CIC observers, the Foreign Section OUN routinely used intimidation and 
even terror against political enemies. CIC reports listed Bandera as “extremely 
dangerous” because he was willing to use violence against Ukrainian rivals in 
Germany.27
In July 1944, before the Soviets took Lwów, the UHVR sent a delegation of its 
senior officials to establish contact with the Vatican and Western governments. 
The delegation was known as the Foreign Representation of the Supreme 
Ukrainian Liberation Council (ZP/UHVR). It included Father Ivan Hrinioch 
as president of the ZP/UHVR; Mykola Lebed as its Foreign Minister; and Yuri 
Lopatinski as the UPA delegate. Hrinioch was a Ukrainian Catholic priest and 
nationalist, who was in Krakow with Bandera and Lebed in 1940. He served 
as liaison between Archbishop Andrei Shepstitski of Lwów and Bishop Ivan 
Buczko, the Uniate Church’s representative at the Vatican. When the Germans 
invaded East Galicia, Hrinioch also had a relationship with Fritz Arlt, a “Jewish 
expert” in the SD, who worked under General Governor Hans Frank in 1940 and 
was charged with contacting Soviet émigrés to serve as German-allied volunteers 
during the invasion in 1941.28 Until 1948, all three envoys were members of the 
OUN/B party and loyal to Bandera. 
In its initial manifesto of July 1944, the UHVR had called for unity of “all 
leading political elements, irrespective of their ideological convictions or political 
affiliation, who uphold the political sovereignty of the Ukrainian state [and] a 
popular democratic mode of determining the political system….”29 If nothing 
else, western Ukrainians learned during the war that they would have to appeal 
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to eastern Ukrainians, from whom they had been separated by geography and 
religion for centuries. The UHVR later rejected “attempts by western Ukrainian 
chauvinists, including Stephen Bandera, to erect a Ukrainian state on a narrowly 
religious, mono-party, totalitarian basis, since the Eastern Ukrainian nationalists 
find such a political philosophy unacceptable.”30 
A feud erupted in 1947 between Bandera and Stetsko on the one hand, 
and Hrinioch and Lebed on the other. Bandera and Stetsko insisted on an 
independent Ukraine under a single party led by one man, Bandera. Hrynioch 
and Lebed declared that the people in the homeland, not Bandera, created the 
UHVR, and that they would never accept Bandera as dictator. 
At an August 1948 Congress of the OUN Foreign Section, Bandera expelled 
the Hrinioch-Lebed group from the party and ordered his own followers in 
their organization to resign. Bandera still controlled 80 percent of the party and 
claimed exclusive authority to direct the Ukrainian national movement at home 
and in the emigration. He also continued terror tactics against anti-Banderist 
Ukrainian leaders in Western Europe and maneuvered for control of Ukrainian 
émigré organizations. U.S. intelligence officials estimated that up to 80 percent 
of all Ukrainian DPs from Eastern Galicia were loyal to Bandera. But Lebed, 
Hrinioch, and Lopatinky remained the official UHVR representation abroad.31 
By this time, the split was no longer just an issue for Ukrainian émigrés. 
Owing to the Berlin Blockade, the Cold War between the western Allies and the 
USSR threatened to erupt into fighting, and Allied intelligence organizations, 
which were interested in Ukrainian contacts, had to choose sides. 
Allied Intelligence and Stephen Bandera 
The CIC first became interested in Stephen Bandera in September 1945. As 
UPA guerrillas made their way by foot into the U.S. Zone of Germany, the CIC 
interrogated them as to the military situation in western Ukraine, the makeup 
of UPA units, their contacts in the U.S. zone, and their connection with Bandera 
himself.32 In 1947 the flow of UPA fighters increased owing to Operation Vistula, 
a Polish army effort to destroy the UPA in southeastern Poland, and more 
information became available. 
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The guerrillas said that most UPA fighters were “ordinary” Banderists, but 
others also listed Slovak Hlinka Guards, Ukrainian SS from the 14th Grenadier 
Waffen-SS (Galicia) Division, and “escaped German SS men” as those among 
the UPA forces. Most UPA fighters recognized Bandera as their leader.33 UPA 
refugees also viewed themselves as refitting rather than quitting. One source 
said in September 1947 that Banderists were recruiting more members in DP 
camps, their main recruiter being Anton Eichner, a former SS officer.34 Other 
interrogations revealed that, “the UPA foresees an end to communism within 
the very near future… Once the war comes… they hope to… fight either as 
front shock troops or gain in their old capacity, as guerilla fighters behind the 
Russian lines….”35
By August 1947 Banderists were represented in every Ukrainian DP 
camp in the U.S. zone as well as in the British and French zones. They 
had a sophisticated courier system reaching into the Ukraine. The CIC 
termed Bandera himself, then in Munich, as “extremely dangerous.” He was 
“constantly en route, frequently in disguise,” with bodyguards ready to “do 
away with any person who may be dangerous to [Bandera] or his party.” UPA 
fighters said that Bandera was “looked upon as the spiritual and national hero 
of all Ukrainians….”36 
Banderists represented themselves as fighting a “heroic Ukrainian resistance 
against the Nazis and the Communists” which had been “misrepresented and 
maligned” by “Moscow propaganda.” Bandera, they never tired of saying, 
had been arrested by the Nazis and held in Sachsenhausen. Now he and his 
movement fought “not only for the Ukraine, but also for all of Europe.”37 As 
for Banderist activities before and during the war, U.S. intelligence officials 
seemed to understand little beyond Bandera’s implication in the Pierecki 
assassination. They understood nothing of the Banderist role in ethnic 
cleansing during the war.
CIC agents also used UPA informants to ferret out Soviet spies from 
Ukrainian DP camps who slipped into Germany with UPA partisans. The 
Soviets had penetrated the UPA bands that made their way west.38 Yuri 
Lopatinski travelled to the Ukrainian camp in Deggendorf in October 1947 
to find Soviet agents.39 UPA members could also provide intelligence on the 
Soviets since, according to UPA officers, they had “done a fairly thorough job 
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of penetrating MVD and Polish intelligence units.”40 “Don’t you think,” said 
one CIC memo, “that this is a H[ell] of a good opportunity to recruit some 
high class informants?”41 
In November 1947 the Soviet military authorities in Berlin insisted that 
UPA members in the U.S. zone be handed over. “Almost all of them, said Lt. 
Col. Igor Bantsyrev (the Chief Soviet Repatriation Representative), “are Soviet 
citizens who participated in the war … against the Allied nations on the side of 
the German fascist Army.”42 CIC officers recommended against it. Extradition 
of the UPA partisans, said one, could “destroy for years the confidence all anti-
Bolshevist forces have in the USA.”43
The Soviets learned that Bandera was in the U.S. zone and demanded his 
arrest. A covert Soviet team even entered the U.S. zone in June 1946 to kidnap 
Bandera.44 The Strategic Services Unit, the postwar successor to the OSS and 
predecessor to the CIA, did not know about the Soviet team. Nonetheless, they 
feared the “serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from 
open US connivance in the unhampered continuance of [Bandera’s] anti-Soviet 
activities on German soil.”45 Since Bandera himself was not trustworthy, they 
were just as pleased to get rid of him.
Despite “an extensive and aggressive search” in mid-1947 that included 
regular weekly updates, CIC officials could not locate Bandera.46 Few photos 
of him existed. One CIC agent complained that Bandera’s agents in Germany 
“have been instructed to disseminate false information concerning the personal 
description of Bandera.”47 Bandera’s agents misled CIC as to his location as well. 
“Aware of our desire to locate Bandera,” read one report, “[they] deliberately 
attempt to ‘throw us off the track’ by giving out false leads.”48 CIC suspended 
the search. Zsolt Aradi, a Hungarian-born journalist with high Vatican contacts 
and the chief contact at the Vatican for the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), 
warned that Bandera’s handover to the Soviets would destroy any relationship 
with the UHVR, which at the time was headed by Banderist members, and 
with Ukrainian clerics at the Vatican like Buczko, who were sympathetic to 
Bandera.49
The CIA never considered entering into an alliance with Bandera to procure 
intelligence from Ukraine. “By nature,” read a CIA report, “[Bandera] is a 
political intransigent of great personal ambition, who [has] since April 1948, 
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opposed all political organizations in the emigration which favor a representative 
form of government in the Ukraine as opposed to a mono-party, OUN/Bandera 
regime.” Worse, his intelligence operatives in Germany were dishonest and not 
secure.50 Debriefings of couriers from western Ukraine in 1948 confirmed that, 
“the thinking of Stephan Bandera and his immediate émigré supporters [has] 
become radically outmoded in the Ukraine.” Bandera was also a convicted 
assassin. By now, word had reached the CIA of Bandera’s fratricidal struggles 
with other Ukrainian groups during the war and in the emigration. By 1951 
Bandera turned vocally anti-American as well, since the US did not advocate 
an independent Ukraine.”51 The CIA had an agent within the Bandera group in 
1951 mostly to keep an eye on Bandera.52
British Intelligence (MI6), however, was interested in Bandera. MI6 first 
contacted Bandera through Gerhard von Mende in April 1948. An ethnic 
German from Riga, von Mende served in Alfred Rosenberg’s Ostministerium 
during the war as head of the section for the Caucasus and Turkestan section, 
recruiting Soviet Muslims from central Asia for use against the USSR. In this 
capacity he was kept personally informed of UPA actions and capabilities.53 
Nothing came of initial British contacts with Bandera because, as the CIA 
learned later, “the political, financial, and tech requirements of the [Ukrainians] 
were higher than the British cared to meet.” But by 1949 MI6 began helping 
Bandera send his own agents into western Ukraine via airdrop. In 1950 
MI6 began training these agents on the expectation that they could provide 
intelligence from western Ukraine.54 
CIA and State Department officials flatly opposed the use of Bandera. By 
1950 the CIA was working with the Hrinioch-Lebed group, and had begun to run 
its own agents into western Ukraine to make contact with the UHVR. Bandera 
no longer had the UHVR’s support or even that of the OUN party leadership 
in Ukraine. Bandera’s agents also deliberately worked against Ukrainian agents 
used by the CIA. In April 1951 CIA officials tried to convince MI6 to pull support 
from Bandera. MI6 refused. They thought that Bandera could run his agents 
without British support, and MI6 were “seeking progressively to assume control 
of Bandera’s lines.”55 The British also thought that the CIA underestimated 
Bandera’s importance. “Bandera’s name,” they said, “still carried considerable 
weight in the Ukraine and … the UPA would look to him first and foremost.”56 
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Moreover, MI6 argued, Bandera’s group was “the strongest Ukrainian 
organization abroad, is deemed competent to train party cadres, [and] build a 
morally and politically healthy organization….”57 
British officials considered “the possibility and desirability of engaging in 
clandestine operations in the Soviet Union other than those of a purely intelligence-
gathering character.”58 But the CIA and State Department officials were “very 
strongly opposed” to London’s idea of returning Bandera to the Ukraine.  Bandera, 
the Americans said, had “lost touch with feelings in the Ukraine, particularly in the 
former Polish territories where… the Soviet government had been successful to 
a remarkable degree in transforming the mentality of the younger generation.”59 
For the CIA, the best solution for intelligence in the Ukraine was the “political 
neutralization of Bandera as an individual….”60 The British argued that such 
“would lead to a drying up of recruits” and “would disrupt British operations….61 
MI6 disregarded the CIA statement that “Bandera…is politically unacceptable to 
the US Government.” 
British operations through Bandera expanded. An early 1954 MI6 summary 
noted that, “the operational aspect of this [British] collaboration [with Bandera] 
was developing satisfactorily. Gradually a more complete control was obtained 
over infiltration operations and although the intelligence dividend was low it 
was considered worthwhile to proceed….”62 Bandera was, according to his 
handlers, “a professional underground worker with a terrorist background and 
ruthless notions about the rules of the game…. A bandit type if you like, with a 
burning patriotism, which provides an ethical background and a justification for 
his banditry. No better and no worse than others of his kind….”63
From inside the Ukraine, the UHVR rejected Bandera’s authoritarian approach 
and demanded unity in the emigration. In messages brought from the Ukraine 
by CIA agents, UHVR insisted in the summer of 1953 that Lebed represented 
“the entire Ukrainian liberation movement in the homeland.”64 American and 
British officials tried to reconcile Bandera to Lebed’s leadership, but Bandera and 
Stetsko refused. In February 1954 London had enough. “There appeared,” reported 
Bandera’s handlers, “to be no alternative but to break with Bandera in order to 
safeguard the healthy ZCh/OUN elements remaining and be able to continue 
using them operationally…. The break between us was complete.” MI6 dropped 
all agents-in-training still loyal to Bandera.65 In July MI6 informed Lebed that it 
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“would not resume [its] relationship with Bandera under any circumstances.” 
MI6 maintained its four wireless links in Ukraine, now run by a reconstituted 
ZCh/OUN, and shared intelligence from the links with Lebed and the CIA.66 The 
degree to which MI6’s links into Ukraine were compromised all along owing to the 
insecurity of Bandera’s lines is not clear.67 
Bandera remained in Munich. He had two British-trained radio operators, and 
he continued to recruit agents on his own. He published a newspaper that spewed 
anti-American rhetoric and used loyal thugs to attack other Ukrainian émigré 
newspapers and to terrorize political opponents in the Ukrainian emigration. 
He attempted to penetrate U.S. military and intelligence offices in Europe and to 
intimidate Ukrainians working for the United States. He continued to run agents into 
the Ukraine, financing them with counterfeit U.S. money. By 1957 the CIA and MI6 
concluded that all former Bandera agents in Ukraine were under Soviet control.68 
The question was what to do. U.S. and British intelligence officials lamented that 
“despite our unanimous desire to ‘quiet’ Bandera, precautions must be taken to see 
that the Soviets are not allowed to kidnap or kill him … under no circumstances 
must Bandera be allowed to become a martyr.”69 
Meanwhile, Bandera searched for new sponsors. For a brief time in 
early 1956, Italian Military Intelligence (SIFAR) sponsored him, surely not 
understanding that his lines were compromised.70 The BND, the West German 
intelligence service under former Wehrmacht Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, formed a 
new relationship with Bandera. It was a natural union. During the war, Gehlen’s 
senior officers argued that the USSR could be broken up if only Germany wooed 
the various nationalities properly. Bandera had continued lines into the Ukraine, 
and in March 1956 he offered these in return for money and weapons.71 The 
CIA warned the West Germans that “against any [operative] relationship with 
Bandera,” noting that, “we [are] convinced [that] all alleged Bandera assets in 
CSR, Poland, and Ukraine [are] non-existent or non-effective. We also note 
rapidity and thoroughness of [Soviet] rollups [of] his past ops indicate weak 
OUN/B security.”72 
The Bavarian state government and Munich police wanted to crack down on 
Bandera’s organization for crimes ranging from counterfeiting to kidnapping. 
Von Mende, now a West German government official, protected him. Bandera 
gave von Mende political reports, which von Mende relayed to the West German 
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Foreign Office. Von Mende routinely intervened with the Bavarian government 
on Bandera’s behalf for residency permits and the like, and now intervened with 
the Bavarian authorities for “false passports and other documentation.”73 The 
exact results of von Mende’s help are not clear, but Bandera was left alone.
In April 1959 Bandera again asked West German intelligence for support and 
this time Gehlen was interested. The CIA noted that, “It [is] apparent that Bandera 
[is] seeking support for illegal ops into Ukraine.” The West Germans agreed to 
support at least one such mission based on the “fact [that] Bandera and group 
no longer the cut throats they were” and because Bandera “supplied proof [of] 
existing contact with inside assets.” A team trained and funded by the BND crossed 
from Czechoslovakia in late July, and the BND promised Bandera support for 
future operations if this one were to be even “moderately successful.” 74   
Bandera’s personal contact in West German intelligence was Heinz Danko 
Herre, Gehlen’s old deputy in Fremde Heere Ost who had worked with the 
Gen. Andrei Vlassov’s army of Russian émigrés and former prisoners in the last 
days of the war and was now Gehlen’s closest adviser.75 CIA officials in Munich 
repeated the usual warnings. Herre was not dissuaded. “Bandera,” Herre said, 
“has been known to us for about 20 years [!]…. Within and without Germany 
he has over half a million followers.” Herre, reported the CIA base in Munich is 
aware of Bandera’s earlier reputation [but] is aware that nothing has happened, 
during the period of [BND’s] association, indicating that Bandera still is using 
his earlier rough tactics…. [Herre] also feels that, in principle, Bandera has more 
to offer operationally than most if not all other Russian (sic) émigré groups in 
the West today. 76  
Herre admitted that West German use of Bandera was a “closely held” secret 
even within the BND and that the relationship was “not cleared with Bonn due 
to political overtones.”77 By September Herre reported that the BND was getting 
“good [foreign intelligence] reports on the Soviet Ukraine” as a result of their 
operations.78 He offered to keep CIA fully informed as to Bandera’s activities 
in return for a favor. Bandera had been trying to obtain a U.S. visa since 1955 
in order to meet with Ukrainian supporters in the United States and to meet 
with State Department and CIA officials. Herre thought that a visa procured 
with West German help would improve his own relationship with Bandera. CIA 
officials in Munich actually recommended the visa in October 1959.79 
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But on October 15, 1959, only 10 days after the CIA Munich base made the 
request, a KGB assassin named Bogdan Stashinskiy murdered Bandera with a 
special gun that sprayed cyanide dust into the victim’s face. The Soviets, who had 
penetrated Bandera’s organization and the BND years before, evidently decided 
that they could not live with another alliance between German intelligence 
officers and Ukrainian fanatics. Stashinskiy received the Order of the Red Banner 
for the job.80 
U.S. Consul General in Munich Edward Page noted that “assassinations are 
nothing new in the Ukrainian nationalist movement.” Though Bandera’s death 
was demoralizing in the sense that the Soviets managed it under the noses of 
Bandera’s bodyguards, Page noted that “many émigré figures do not personally 
lament his passing,” given Bandera’s strong-arm tactics with his political rivals 
in the Ukrainian emigration, particularly those leaning toward democratic 
institutions.81 Bandera’s faction continued to exist but was thoroughly penetrated 
by the KGB even at the highest levels.82 Regardless, Herre maintained contact 
with Bandera’s deputies in West Germany until 1961.83
The United States and Mykola Lebed
Mykola Lebed’s relationship with the CIA lasted the entire length of the Cold 
War. While most CIA operations involving wartime perpetrators backfired, Leb-
ed’s operations augmented the fundamental instability of the Soviet Union. 
Attempts to build a relationship in 1945 and 1946 between the SSU and 
the Hrinioch-Lebed group never materialized owing to its initial mistrust.84 In 
December 1946 Hrinioch and Lopatinsky asked for U.S. help for operations 
in the Ukraine ranging from communications to agent training to money and 
weapons. In return, they would create intelligence networks in the Ukraine. 
Zsolt Aradi, the SSU’s contact in the Vatican, approved the relationship. He 
noted that the “UHVR, UPA, and OUN-Bandera are the only large and efficient 
organizations among Ukrainians,” and that Hrinioch, Lebed and Lopatinsky 
were “determined and able men… resolved to carry on…with or without us, and 
if necessary against us.”85 The SSU declined. A later report blamed the Ukrainians 
for “ineptitude in arguing their case and factionalism among the emigration.”86
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A CIC report from July 1947 cited sources that called Lebed a “well-known 
sadist and collaborator of the Germans.”87 Regardless, the CIC in Rome took 
up Lebed’s offer whereby Lebed provided information on Ukrainian émigré 
groups, Soviet activities in the U.S. zone, and information on the Soviets and 
Ukrainians more generally. In Munich, Hrinioch became a CIC informant as 
well. In November 1947 Hrinioch requested on behalf of Bandera himself that 
the U.S. authorities move Lebed from Rome to Munich to protect him from 
Soviet extradition requests when American military government in Italy ended 
the following month. CIC in Munich was gaining Hrinioch’s confidence and 
hoped to set up a meeting with Bandera himself.88 The Army moved Lebed and 
his family to Munich in December. In the meantime, Lebed sanitized his wartime 
record and that of the Bandera group and UPA with a 126-page book on the 
latter which emphasized their fight against the Germans and Soviets.89 
The Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the threat of a European war prompted the 
CIA to scrutinize Soviet émigré groups and the degree to which they could provide 
crucial intelligence. In Project ICON, the CIA studied 30 groups and recommended 
operational cooperation with the Hrinioch-Lebed group as the organization 
best suited for clandestine work. Compared with Bandera, Hrinioch and Lebed 
represented a moderate, stable, and operationally secure group with the firmest 
connections to the Ukrainian underground in the USSR. A resistance/intelligence 
group behind Soviet lines would be useful if war broke out. The CIA provided 
money, supplies, training, facilities for radio broadcasts, and parachute drops of 
trained agents to augment slower courier routes through Czechoslovakia used by 
UPA fighters and messengers.90 As Lebed put it later, “the … drop operations were 
the first real indication … that American Intelligence was willing to give active 
support to establishing lines of communication into the Ukraine.”91  
CIA operations with these Ukrainians began in 1948 under the cryptonym 
CARTEL, soon changed to AERODYNAMIC. Hrinioch stayed in Munich, but 
Lebed relocated to New York and acquired permanent resident status, then 
U.S. citizenship. It kept him safe from assassination, allowed him to speak to 
Ukrainian émigré groups, and permitted him to return to the United States after 
operational trips to Europe. His identification in New York by other Ukrainians 
as a leader responsible for “wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Poles and Jewish 
(sic),” has been discussed elsewhere.92 
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Once in the United States, Lebed was the CIA’s chief contact for 
AERODYNAMIC. CIA handlers pointed to his “cunning character,” his 
“relations with the Gestapo and … Gestapo training,” that the fact that he was “a 
very ruthless operator.”93 “Neither party,” said one CIA official while comparing 
Bandera and Lebed, “is lily-white.”94 Like Bandera, Lebed was also constantly 
irritated that the United States never promoted the USSR’s fragmentation along 
national lines; that the United States worked with imperial-minded Russian 
émigré groups as well as Ukrainian ones; and that the United States later followed 
a policy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviets. 
On the other hand, Lebed had no personal political aspirations. He was 
unpopular among many Ukrainian émigrés owing to his brutal takeover of the 
UPA during the war––a takeover that included the assassination of rivals.95 He 
was absolutely secure. To prevent Soviet penetration, he allowed no one in his 
inner circle who arrived in the West after 1945. He was said to have a first-rate 
operational mind, and by 1948 he was, according to Dulles, “of inestimable value 
to this Agency and its operations.”96 The CIA’s AERODYNAMIC files contain 
tremendous operational detail on AERODYNAMIC, most of which cannot be 
recounted here.
AERODYNAMIC’s first phase involved infiltration into Ukraine and then ex-
filtration of CIA-trained Ukrainian agents. By January 1950 the CIA’s arm for the 
collection of secret intelligence (Office of Special Operations, OSO) and its arm for 
covert operations (Office of Policy Coordination, OPC) participated. Operations 
in that year revealed “a well established and secure underground movement” in 
the Ukraine that was even “larger and more fully developed than previous reports 
had indicated.” Washington was especially pleased with the high level of UPA 
training in the Ukraine and its potential for further guerrilla actions, and with “the 
extraordinary news that … active resistance to the Soviet regime was spreading 
steadily eastward, out of the former Polish, Greek Catholic provinces.”97 
The CIA decided to expand its operations for “the support, development, 
and exploitation of the Ukrainian underground movement for resistance and 
intelligence purposes.” “In view of the extent and activity of the resistance 
movement in the Ukraine,” said OPC Chief Frank Wisner, “we consider this to be 
a top priority project.”98 The CIA learned of UPA activities in various Ukrainian 
districts; the Soviet commitment of police troops to destroy the UPA; the UPA’s 
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resonance with Ukrainians; and the UPA’s potential to expand to 100,000 
fighters in wartime. The work was not without hazards. Individual members of 
teams from 1949 to 1953 were captured and killed. By 1954 Lebed’s group lost all 
contact with UHVR. By that time the Soviets subdued both the UHVR and UPA, 
and the CIA ended the aggressive phase of AERODYNAMIC.99  
Beginning in 1953 AERODYNAMIC began to operate through a Ukrainian 
study group under Lebed’s leadership in New York under CIA auspices, which 
collected Ukrainian literature and history and produced Ukrainian nationalist 
newspapers, bulletins, radio programming, and books for distribution in the 
Ukraine. In 1956 this group was formally incorporated as the non-profit Prolog 
Research and Publishing Association. It allowed the CIA to funnel funds as 
ostensible private donations without taxable footprints.100 To avoid nosey New 
York State authorities, the CIA turned Prolog into a for-profit enterprise called 
Prolog Research Corporation, which ostensibly received private contracts. 
Under Hrinioch, Prolog maintained a Munich office named the Ukrainische-
Gesellschaft für Auslandsstudien, EV. Most publications were created here.101 
The Hrinioch-Lebed organization still existed, but its activities ran entirely 
through Prolog.102
Prolog recruited and paid Ukrainian émigré writers who were generally 
unaware that they worked in a CIA-controlled operation. Only the six top 
members of the ZP/UHVR were witting agents. Beginning in 1955, leaflets 
were dropped over the Ukraine by air and radio broadcasts titled Nova Ukraina 
were aired in Athens for Ukrainian consumption. These activities gave way 
to systematic mailing campaigns to Ukraine through Ukrainian contacts in 
Poland and émigré contacts in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Spain, Sweden, 
and elsewhere. The newspaper Suchasna Ukrainia (Ukraine Today), information 
bulletins, a Ukrainian language journal for intellectuals called Suchasnist (The 
Present), and other publications were sent to libraries, cultural institutions, 
administrative offices and private individuals in Ukraine. These activities 
encouraged Ukrainian nationalism, strengthened Ukrainian resistance, and 
provided an alternative to Soviet media.103 
In 1957 alone, with CIA support, Prolog broadcast 1,200 radio programs 
totaling 70 hours per month and distributed 200,000 newspapers and 5,000 
pamphlets. In the years following, Prolog distributed books by nationalist 
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Ukrainian writers and poets. One CIA analyst judged that, “some form 
of nationalist feeling continues to exist [in the Ukraine] and … there is an 
obligation to support it as a cold war weapon.” The distribution of literature in 
the Soviet Ukraine continued to the end of the Cold War.104
Prolog also garnered intelligence after Soviet travel restrictions eased 
somewhat in the late 1950s. It supported the travel of émigré Ukrainian 
students and scholars to academic conferences, international youth festivals, 
musical and dance performances, the Rome Olympics and the like, where 
they could speak with residents of the Soviet Ukraine in order to learn 
about living conditions there as well as the mood of Ukrainians toward the 
Soviet regime. Prolog’s leaders and agents debriefed travelers on their return 
and shared information with the CIA. In 1966 alone Prolog personnel had 
contacts with 227 Soviet citizens. Beginning in 1960 Prolog also employed 
a CIA-trained Ukrainian spotter named Anatol Kaminsky. He created a 
net of informants in Europe and the United States made up of Ukrainian 
émigrés and other Europeans travelling to Ukraine who spoke with Soviet 
Ukrainians in the USSR or with Soviet Ukrainians travelling in the West. By 
1966 Kaminsiky was Prolog’s chief operations officer, while Lebed provided 
overall management. 
In this guise, AERODYNAMIC was one of the most effective CIA 
operations in approaching disaffected Soviet citizens. In the 1960s Prolog’s 
leaders provided reports on Ukrainian politics, dissident Ukrainian poets, 
individuals connected with the KGB as well as identities of KGB officers, 
Soviet missiles and aircraft in western Ukraine, and a host of other topics. 
Official Soviet attacks on the ZP/UHVR as Banderists, German collaborators, 
American agents, and the like were evidence of Prolog’s effectiveness, as were 
Soviet crackdowns on Ukrainian writers and other dissidents in the mid to late 
1960s. By that time Prolog influenced a new Ukrainian generation. By 1969 
Ukrainians traveling from the USSR were instructed by dissidents there to take 
informational materials on Soviet repression in Ukraine only to ZP/UHVR 
personnel. Travelers to Ukraine even reported seeing ZP/UHVR literature in 
private homes. Prolog had become in the words of one senior CIA official, 
the sole “vehicle for CIA’s operations directed at the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic and [its] forty million Ukrainian citizens.”105 
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Lebed overtly distanced himself and the Ukrainian national movement from 
the overt anti-Semitism of his Banderist days. In 1964 he publicly condemned 
in the name of the ZP/UHVR the appearance of Judaism without Embellishment, 
published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. The book was typical 
of the anti-Semitic diatribes of the early 20th century with the exception that it 
actually linked Jews with the Nazis in the attack on the USSR. The book signaled 
growing Soviet repression of dissident Jews, including the closing of synagogues 
and prohibitions on Passover Matzoh.106 Lebed actually saw the book as a Soviet 
attempt to paint Ukrainians with a broad anti-Semitic brush. More to protect the 
name of Ukrainian nationalism, he publicly condemned the “provocative libel” 
and “slanderous statements” against Jews, adding in a particularly forgetful note 
that, “the Ukrainian people…are opposed to all and any preaching of hatred for 
other people.”107 Ironically, the CIA had Prolog translate sections of the book into 
French for distribution to left-wing groups in Europe who had been sympathetic 
to the Soviets. Former Banderists, in other words, now attacked the Soviets for 
anti-Semitism rather than with it.108
Lebed retired in 1975 but remained an adviser and consultant to Prolog 
and the ZP/UHVR. Roman Kupchinsky, a Ukrainian journalist who was a 
one-year-old when the war ended, became Prolog’s chief in 1978. In the 1980s 
AERODYNAMIC’s name was changed to QRDYNAMIC and in the 1980s 
PDDYNAMIC and then QRPLUMB. In 1977 President Carter’s National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski helped to expand the program owing to 
what he called its “impressive dividends” and the “impact on specific audiences 
in the target area.”109 In the 1980s Prolog expanded its operations to reach other 
Soviet nationalities, and in a supreme irony, these included dissident Soviet 
Jews.110 With the USSR teetering on the brink of collapse in 1990, QRPLUMB 
was terminated with a final payout of $1.75 million. Prolog could continue its 
activities, but it was on its own financially.111 
In June 1985 the General Accounting Office mentioned Lebed’s name in a 
public report on Nazis and collaborators who settled in the United States with 
help from U.S. intelligence agencies. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in 
the Department of Justice began investigating Lebed that year. The CIA worried 
that public scrutiny of Lebed would compromise QRPLUMB and that failure to 
protect Lebed would trigger outrage in the Ukrainian émigré community. It thus 
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shielded Lebed by denying any connection between Lebed and the Nazis and by 
arguing that he was a Ukrainian freedom fighter. The truth, of course, was more 
complicated. As late as 1991 the CIA tried to dissuade OSI from approaching the 
German, Polish, and Soviet governments for war-related records related to the 
OUN. OSI eventually gave up the case, unable to procure definitive documents 
on Lebed. Mykola Lebed, Bandera’s wartime chief in Ukraine, died in 1998. He 
is buried in New Jersey, and his papers are located at the Ukrainian Research 
Institute at Harvard University.
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CONCLUSION
This report discusses only a sample of newly released records, hinting at their 
overall richness. The 1.3 million Army files include thousands of titles of many 
more issues regarding wartime criminals, their pursuit, their arrest, their escape, 
and occasionally, their use by Allied and Soviet intelligence agencies. These 
include files on German war criminals, but also collaborators from the Baltic 
States, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, and elsewhere. These files 
also include information on Allied and non-aligned states that had an interest 
in Axis personalities, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Argentina, and Israel.
The 1,110 re-released or newly released CIA name files are in most cases 
far more detailed than the files of the initial CIA release in 2001 and after. They 
contain a trove of information on Nazis who eventually worked for the Gehlen 
Organization or as Soviet spies after the war. They hold information about 
important Nazi officials who escaped and became figures of security interest 
in other countries spanning the globe from the Middle East to South America. 
Together, the Army and CIA records will keep scholars of World War II and the 
Cold War busy for many years.
The new files also have postwar intelligence on other subjects. The CIC kept 
close watch on other suspect groups, such as German communists, and kept 
thousands of files on them. They kept watch on politically active Jewish refugees 
in displaced persons camps. Indeed, there are many hundreds of newly released 
files concerning the remnant of European Jews who searched for a new life in 
Palestine or the United States. Thus the new records are of great interest to those 
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researching a very broad range of topics from international Communism to the 
Jewish diaspora to the history of mass migration.         
The declassification of intelligence-related material is a controversial 
subject, involving as it does the release of records formerly of national security 
interest.  The current releases show, however, that the passage of years lessens the 
information’s sensitivity while providing researchers access to raw information 
that is simply not available elsewhere. By their very nature, intelligence agencies 
attain and record information that other government or non-government 
organizations cannot. None of the chapters in this report could have been written 
without declassified intelligence records, nor could the many articles and books 
that will emerge as a result of the current release. The funding for declassification 
and the assurance that intelligence records are opened to the public thus preserve 
key aspects of world history. In the interest of understanding our past Congress 
should, in our view, ensure that such openness continues.   
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ACRONYMS
BfV Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (West Germany’s domestic 
intelligence agency) Office for the Protection of the Constitution
BND German Secret Service
CIC U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps
KPD German Communist Party
KPÖ Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs
IRR Investigative Records Repository
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi Party)
OPC Office of Policy Coordination
OSO Office of Special Operations
OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
ÖVP Osterreichische Volkspartei
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office)
SD Sicherheitsdienst (SS Intelligence Organization)
SDECE Documentation and External Counterespionage Service (French 
Intelligence)
SIFAR Italian Military Intelligence
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs
SRP Socialist Reich Party
SSU Strategic Services Unit
UHVR Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council
UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army
VdU Verband der Unabhänginge
VVN Union of Nazi Persecutees
WJC World Jewish Congress

